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Police routinely use deception to get into people’s homes without 
warrant or probable cause. They may pose as UPS delivery persons or 
homebuyers, or they may say they are looking for a kidnapping victim or a 
pedophile, when really they are looking for drugs or guns. Recent years have 
brought hundreds of reported decisions concerning such police ruses. 
When the police lie about their identity or their purpose to enter a 
home, as when they pose as a homebuyer, the courts surprisingly, but 
routinely, approve these deceptions under the Fourth Amendment. Such 
intrusions, the courts reason, do not violate a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy and therefore do not even trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
But the Supreme Court has announced a new Fourth 
Amendment test based on the civil law of trespass, and this new test 
promises to provide more Fourth Amendment protection against 
police deception. Now, under United States v. Jones and Florida v. 
Jardines, any time the police trespass to gain information, they 
trigger Fourth Amendment protections. 
Although Jones and Jardines did not involve police deception, this 
Article applies, for the first time, the police trespass rule stated in these 
cases to police deception cases. It makes the claim that the new trespass 
test should change the outcomes in the leading police deception cases. 
After all, these deceptive intrusions would otherwise count as trespasses 
absent consent, and under ordinary trespass principles deception vitiates 
consent. Without consent, the intrusion counts as a civil trespass and 
triggers Fourth Amendment protection.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Police routinely use deception to get into people’s homes 
without a warrant or probable cause. They have posed as UPS 
delivery persons2 or homebuyers,3 or they say they are looking for a 
kidnapping victim4 or a pedophile,5 when really they are looking for 
drugs, guns, or stolen property. Recent years have brought hundreds 
of reported decisions concerning such police ruses.6 On the federal 
level, law enforcement, both civil and criminal, has sharply increased 
its use of undercover officers.7 
Police deceptions can become somewhat involved, engendering 
both alarm and perhaps grudging admiration. In United States v. 
Baldwin,8 for example, a police officer chose to investigate a 
Memphis nightclub owner by imbedding himself in the suspect’s life 
for nearly six months. The officer took a job as a bartender at 
Baldwin’s Playgirl club, soon becoming manager of the club, driver 
of Baldwin’s car, and even a roommate in Baldwin’s home. The 
officer used his special access to search Baldwin’s car and bedroom, 
finding cocaine residue in both places—all without a warrant or 
 
 2. United States v. Miglietta, 507 F. Supp. 353, 355 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
 3. United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993) (police posed as 
potential renters and saw cocaine in plain view); People v. Lucatero, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 366 
(Ct. App. 2008). 
 4. United States v. Vazquez-Velazquez, No. 1:11-CR-212-TCB-GGB, 2012 WL 
917845 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2012) (agents asked to search house for a nonexistent kidnapping 
victim when really looking for drugs). 
 5. Krause v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Ky. 2006) (police falsely told a 
resident they wanted to search the house to see if it was the place where a young girl had 
recently been raped when really looking for drugs); Redmond v. State, 73 A.3d 385, 389–90 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (police claimed to be seeking a pedophile when really seeking 
entrance to the home to look for a stolen cellphone). 
 6. E.g., United States v. Wei Seng Phua, F. Supp. 3d., 2015 WL 1757489 (D. Nev. 
Apr. 17, 2015) (officers cut off Internet connection so they could pose as technicians); United 
States v. Hattaway, No. CR. 13-50047-JLV, 2014 WL 172295 (D.S.D. Jan. 10, 2014) (officer 
claimed an interest in mountain lions when really investigating illegal fire arms possession); 
People v. Johnson, No. D056775, 2011 WL 724691 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2011) (officer 
claimed a neighbor reported that the resident had been the victim of domestic abuse when 
really looking for pre-recorded buy money); People v. Nelson, 296 P.3d 177, 181 (Colo. App. 
2012) (plainclothes officer pretended to be a maintenance man when really looking for drugs); 
Redmond, 73 A.3d at 385; State v. Hoffman, 318 P.3d 225, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) 
(officer covering peephole to conceal his identity).  
 7. Eric Lichtblau & William M. Arkin, More Federal Agencies Are Using Undercover 
Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2014 at A1 (“The federal government has significantly 
expanded undercover operations in recent years.”). 
 8. United States v. Baldwin, 621 F.2d 251, 252 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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probable cause. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held this investigation 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment; in fact, it held the Fourth 
Amendment did not even apply.9 
Courts have generally held that police deceptions, at least when 
the officer lies about both identity and purpose, do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.10 The deceptive entry, according to these 
courts, does not violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
and therefore does not count as a Fourth Amendment search.11 The 
fact that the officers have a good motive—to ferret out crime—also 
has played a role in courts’ assessments.12 
But this ample leeway for police deception may be about to 
change. In the last two years, the Supreme Court has supplemented 
the privacy test for the Fourth Amendment search by creating a new 
test based upon civil trespass to property.13 In United States v. Jones 
and Florida v. Jardines, the Court held that when the police commit 
a civil trespass to obtain information, they have conducted a Fourth 
Amendment search, generally requiring a warrant and probable 
cause.14 As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Jones, “for most of 
our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a 
particular concern for government trespass upon the areas . . . it 
enumerates.”15 The trespass test, as a supplement to the privacy test, 
would create a bright-line rule and a constitutional “minimum”16 
that the easily manipulated privacy test did not supply. Any civil 
trespass to the home, even a technical one,17 used to obtain 
information, counts as a Fourth Amendment search. 
The question thus arises: will this new trespass test change the 
police deception cases under the Fourth Amendment? Neither Jones 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 
1273 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Miglietta, 507 F. Supp. 353 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
 11. See Miglietta, 507 F. Supp. at 355–56; Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337–
38, 340 (2000). 
 12. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
 13. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012). 
 14. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–51. 
 15. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. 
 16. Id. at 953. 
 17. In Jones, the police placed a GPS device on the undercarriage of a Jeep Grand 
Cherokee, causing no physical harm to the property but counting, technically, as a trespass to 
chattel. 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
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nor Jardines involved deception, but their trespass rule for Fourth 
Amendment search would still apply to police intrusions by 
deception. That is, if the police officers were ordinary citizens, would 
their conduct amount to a trespass exposing them to civil liability? If 
so, then the same police conduct should likewise be considered a 
trespass and, therefore, a Fourth Amendment search. If, for example, 
the officer’s intrusion into Baldwin’s home described above amounts 
to a trespass because he had obtained consent by deception, then the 
Fourth Amendment would apply, requiring him to first obtain a 
warrant based upon probable cause before engaging in the deceptive 
tactics described above. Thus, to answer a Fourth Amendment 
question, we must answer a civil trespass law question. 
This Article is the first to look to the law of civil trespass to 
determine whether the police trespass when they intrude by 
deception, thereby triggering Fourth Amendment protections. In 
other words, we must survey the civil trespass cases that involve 
deception to support the conclusion that police trespass when they 
employ similar deception.  
The bad news is that these civil trespass by deception cases 
themselves are largely a mess.18 One court found these cases so 
bewildering that it refused to rule, stating, “there is no clear majority 
rule on the subject of fraud vitiating consent to entry upon land.”19 
These cases mostly involve journalists lying to gain entry to conduct 
undercover exposés. Some courts find civil trespass once the 
journalist uses deception to enter the property; others find no 
trespass until the journalist begins secretly filming; and still others 
find no trespass even if the journalist secretly films. This Article, in 
seeking to clarify the Fourth Amendment rule for deceptive entries, 
must therefore focus much of its discussion sorting through the civil 
trespass cases, as well as general tort and trespass principles, to 
ascertain what the trespass rule ought to be. Only then can we apply 
that rule to police deception trespasses for purposes of Fourth 
Amendment analysis. 
 
 18. Compare Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(investigators posing as patients to enter an eye clinic did not trespass), with Food Lion v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (news reporters posing as employees 
and secretly filming did trespass). 
 19. LL NJ, Inc. v. NBC-Subsidiary (WCAU-TV), L.P., No. 06-14312, 2008 WL 
1923261 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (undercover reporters secretly filmed a face-lift clinic). 
The court used the abstention doctrine literally to avoid deciding the case. 
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As for civil trespass, this Article makes the following claim: when 
a person lies about her identity and purpose to obtain consent to 
enter private property, that deception vitiates consent, thereby 
transforming the entry into a trespass. Even this rule must be 
modified somewhat below, but it represents a starting point that 
enjoys support from the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ general 
view on consent,20 as well as from numerous trespass cases involving 
a wide range of trespassers—from journalists21 to burglars22—who 
used deception to gain entry. General legal principles support the 
rule as well. As Jed Rubenfeld recently observed in a similar context, 
“in virtually every area of the law outside of rape, a consent procured 
through deception is no consent at all.”23 
Finally, the rule that deception vitiates consent flows naturally from 
the central interest trespass protects: the right to choose whom to 
exclude. A person typically decides whether to admit or exclude another 
based upon that other person’s identity and purpose. For example, a 
resident will invite a neighbor in for coffee but not for the neighbor to 
snoop around. She will invite a UPS delivery person in to deliver a 
package but not a DEA agent to investigate crimes. Since purpose and 
identity play such central roles in a resident’s decision to consent to 
another’s entry, lies about both are substantial and vitiate consent. 
But as noted above, some courts disagree,24 at least with respect 
to those cases where the intruder seeks not personal gain but the 
higher purpose of uncovering wrongdoing. At least one scholar 
 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1979). (“If the person consenting 
to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning the nature 
of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake 
is known to the other or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, the consent is not 
effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.”) 
 21. Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 681 N.Y.S. 2d 511 (App. Div. 
1998); see also Med. Lab. Mgmt. Cons. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. 
Ariz. 1998) (finding trespass by undercover reporters, apparently even apart from 
videotaping), aff’d by Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 306 F.3d 
806 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 22. See Johnson v. State, 921 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 2005) (“Consent obtained by trick or 
fraud is actually no consent at all and will not serve as a defense to burglary.”); State v. 
Fuller, 296 S.E. 2d 871 (S.C. 1982) (claiming his car broke down and he needed to use a 
phone—trespass). 
 23. E.g. Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual 
Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1372 (2013). 
 24. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1994); Am. Transmission, 
Inc. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 609 N.W.2d 607 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (TV reporters 
posing as customers of car transmission repair shop). 
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would expressly recognize an exception to trespass for journalists 
because of this higher purpose.25 In the civil trespass arena involving 
journalists, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment also lies 
in the background. Though that clause does not permit the media to 
violate a law of general applicability, it does seem to exert some force 
on courts when they provide what appears to be a special trespass 
rule for journalists using deception. 
While it is tempting to loosen or completely vitiate ordinary 
trespass rules for journalists, police, and others who intrude through 
deception for a higher purpose, we should resist that temptation. It 
leads to an irreconcilable conflict with the greater body of trespass 
law and principles.  
There is also a subtler solution to the deception problem within 
trespass law itself. First, a rule allowing journalists, for example, to 
trespass for their higher purposes runs quickly into a fatal 
contradiction. These journalists would not be permitted by the 
landowner to openly intrude to uncover wrongdoing. The law does 
not afford individuals entry simply by their announcing admirable or 
humanitarian intentions for entry. For example, an animal rights 
activist could not arrive at a factory farm and demand entry to film 
merely by shouting “public interest.” Sam Donaldson26 or James 
O’Keefe,27 masters of the undercover camera, could not pull up to a 
business and demand entry to film wrongdoing.28 If they persisted in 
 
 25. Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1117–18 (2011) (right 
to exclude under trespass should sometimes yield to society’s need to know); Paul A. LeBel, 
The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment Protection from 
Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145 (1996); 
Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1097 (1999). But see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive 
Newsgathering and What the Law Should do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173 (1998) (urging 
courts to enhance the tort of intrusion upon seclusion while also creating a newsgathering 
privilege for appropriate scenarios); David A. Logan, “Stunt Journalism,” Professional Norms, 
and Public Mistrust of the Media, 9 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POLY 151 (arguing undercover 
deceptive practices lead the public to mistrust journalists). 
 26. Sam Donaldson co-anchored ABC’s Primetime Live, which used deception 
regularly and became the defendant in many leading lawsuits over those techniques, 
including Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1345, and Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 
505, 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 27. See Chafets, infra 57. 
 28. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (“[G]enerally applicable 
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press 
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”). 
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entering over objections, their entry would constitute trespass.29 In 
fact, the landowner would be privileged to use force to eject Sam 
Donaldson if he refused to leave precisely because the law deems him 
a trespasser. Why then should deception give these interlopers more 
rights? In other words, important social needs do not justify open 
trespass, and so should not justify trespass by deception. 
Second, and more importantly, we do not need to abandon 
ordinary trespass rules to craft a workable solution in the civil arena 
to the journalism cases because trespass law itself makes clear that 
their trespasses will ordinarily lead to nominal damages only. That is, 
trespass law denominates a journalist’s intrusion as a trespass, 
whether openly against the landowner’s wishes or by deception, but 
the landowner can recover only for physical harm to the property.30 
A landowner cannot recover for downstream harms that arise 
indirectly as a result, for example, of a news report. For those 
downstream harms, libel law, with its higher standard of proof, 
remains the appropriate cause of action. In a typical journalism 
trespass case, therefore, even though the reporters have trespassed, 
the aggrieved business could recover only $1 in damages for the 
trespass—assuming the reporters did not disrupt the business. 
We have thus found a solution within ordinary trespass law for 
the problem of deceptive journalists. A journalist’s deceptive entry is 
a trespass. If the owner discovers the deception, he may use force to 
eject the journalist if she refuses to leave. If the owner discovers the 
deception later, that owner may sue in trespass, but recover nominal 
damages only, assuming there is no physical harm to the property. If 
the subject of the journalist’s exposé wants recovery for the harm 
resulting from the news report, rather than for the intrusion itself, 
she must sue in libel and meet its higher requirements. Trespass thus 
addresses any harm leading from the physical intrusion itself; libel 
law addresses harm from the content.31 
After a necessary detour into the civil world of trespass, we have 
a rule that we can apply to the police: their deception as to both 
identity and purpose vitiates consent and transforms their entry into 
 
 29. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
 30. See, e.g., Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 515 n.3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 
(1979). But see Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 31. As discussed below, the Fourth Circuit largely reflected this allocation between 
trespass and libel law. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 510. 
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a trespass. That trespass triggers Fourth Amendment protections 
requiring a warrant and probable cause.  
In the Baldwin case described above, the police officer lied about 
his identity and purpose when taking work with Baldwin and moving 
into his home. Accordingly, these lies vitiated Baldwin’s consent, 
transforming the officer’s intrusion of Baldwin’s car and home into 
trespasses and therefore Fourth Amendment searches. Since these 
intrusions occurred without a warrant or probable cause, they 
violated the Fourth Amendment and would have required that the 
cocaine be excluded from evidence at trial. Similarly, when officers 
pose as homebuyers or UPS delivery persons, their lies vitiate the 
resident’s consent, rendering the deceptive entry an unlawful Fourth 
Amendment search. 
But this solution raises a new problem. In the law enforcement 
context, a trespass by police officers during an investigation triggers 
the Fourth Amendment, even absent physical damage to the 
property. Thus, a “nominal” trespass by police officers, if you will, 
still triggers robust Fourth Amendment protections requiring the 
exclusion of evidence32—hard medicine that will deter such deceptive 
intrusions.33 Trespass law thus creates an asymmetry between the 
consequences of a police trespass versus those of a journalist trespass. 
This asymmetry should not deter us from applying the trespass 
rule proposed here—that deception vitiates consent—to law 
enforcement. In the final analysis, this asymmetry is justified by our 
constitutional order, as erected by the First and Fourth 
Amendments. As elaborated below, the Fourth Amendment does give 
the police the right to trespass, but they must first obtain a warrant 
based upon probable cause. By contrast, journalists never have a 
right to trespass, but if they do, the First Amendment limits damages 
in ways congruent with the law of trespass, precluding recovery for 
damage arising from the broadcast of true information. 
This Article will progress in increasing complexity. Part I surveys 
the numerous uses to which people put deception to gain entry and 
uncover wrongdoing—a broad view of the landscape of fraudulently 
obtained consent. Parts II through IV show how the new Fourth 
 
 32. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009) (explaining that a deliberate 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, especially by intruding into the home without a warrant, 
requires exclusion of evidence). 
 33. E.g., id. at 144. (noting the exclusionary rule applies only if it will “meaningfully 
deter” Fourth Amendment violations). 
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Amendment trespass test handed down in Jones will change the 
outcome of police deception cases. Specifically, Part II shows how 
the old Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy test” 
largely endorsed police deception, at least when the police disguised 
both their identity and their purpose. Part III then ascertains the 
civil trespass rule for eventual application to law enforcement: 
deceptive entry to find evidence of wrongdoing constitutes a 
trespass. But this broad claim makes some compromises with reality 
and precedent by excluding a distinct class of deception, what we 
might call tester cases.34 Part IV applies this new trespass rule for 
deception to the law enforcement cases, noting in particular changed 
outcomes. Finally, Part V shows how the consequences of a trespass 
will usually vary between law enforcement and journalists—exclusion 
of evidence versus nominal damages. It defends this apparent 
asymmetry by arguing that the First and Fourth Amendments have 
largely set these varying outcomes. 
I. TYPES OF DECEPTION 
This section first sketches the types of deception I will consider 
in this Article, specifically those by the police as well as those on the 
civil side, such as journalists, animal rights activists, and civil rights 
testers. It then briefly surveys how professional organizations and 
scholars have assessed the ethics and legality of such deceptions. 
A. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement uses deception regularly. Law enforcement 
personnel may disguise their identity to gain entrance to a home in 
search of drugs or other evidence of crime. These entries are 
potential trespasses and form the backbone of this Article. They 
include police posing as a delivery person to find drugs in plain 
view;35 Department of Fish and Wildlife agents posing as 
homebuyers to find, for example, moose bones supporting a charge 
 
 34. See Northside Realty Ass’n., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348,1354–55 (5th Cir. 
1979); Anthony L. Fargo & Laurence B. Alexander, Testing the Boundaries of the First 
Amendment Press Clause: A Proposal for Protecting the Media from Newsgathering Torts, 32 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 1093, 1147 (2009) (proposing journalists enjoy a privilege to 
trespass and commit other torts when acting as a “tester”). Fargo and Alexander define 
“tester” far more broadly than I would, however. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 35. See United States v. Miglietta, 507 F. Supp. 353, 355 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
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of taking a moose out of season;36 police posing as college students 
to find booze at a fraternity party;37 BATF agents posing as 
construction workers to search for guns;38 officers posing as strip 
club patrons in search of prostitution;39 and agents posing as 
potential renters.40 
Alternatively, police may disguise their purpose but not their 
identity, such as by claiming to investigate a child kidnapping41 or 
pretending to investigate a gas leak42 when they are actually 
investigating the resident for drug possession. Or they may simply lie 
and claim to have a search warrant when they do not.43 
Finally, police have used a ruse even when they have a search or 
arrest warrant, in order to gain entry or execute the warrant more 
safely.44 Of course, police may also obtain a warrant in order to 
conduct an undercover investigation. These cases lie outside the 
scope of this Article, since they involve warrants. 
B. Journalists 
Journalists regularly use deception to report on stories.45 For 
example, reporters from ABC Primetime Live lied on their resumes 
to get jobs at Food Lion grocery store so they could enter the 
private area where meat was prepared.46 Washington Post reporters 
entered Walter Reed Veteran’s Hospital for months to uncover 
squalid conditions and poor medical care,47 leading to a Pulitzer 
Prize as well as promises of reform. 
 
 36. See Guidry v. States, 671 P.2d 1277 (Alaska 1983); see also People v. Lucatero, 166 
Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1112 (2008) (posing as homebuyer). 
 37. See State v. Carey, 417 A.2d 979, 980 (Me. 1980). 
 38. See United States v. Scherer, 673 F.2d 176, 181 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 39. See Wooten v. Super. Ct., 93 Cal. App. 4th 422, 425 (2001). 
 40. See  United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 41. United States v. Vazquez-Velazquez, No. 1:11–CR–212–TCB–GGB, 2012 WL 
917845, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2012). 
 42. See People v. Jefferson, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (App. Div. 1973). 
 43. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 546–47 (1968). 
 44. State v. Eleneki, 993 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Haw. 2000). 
 45. BROOKE KROEGER, UNDERCOVER REPORTING: THE TRUTH ABOUT 
DECEPTION (2012). 
 46. The ABC reporters lied about their names, their work histories, and even concocted 
phony references. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 
1999); KROEGER, supra note 45 at, 151–155.  
 47. Dana Priest & Anne Hull, Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration at Army’s Top Medical 
Facility, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2007, at A1. The reporters did not actively deceive or lie but 
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But reporters have been using disguises since the 1820s or 
earlier,48 such as posing as slave buyers at massive, one hundred slave 
auctions in the South to report the gruesome details to Northern 
readers.49 In 1887, a reporter for the New York World, Nellie Bly, 
went undercover to detail the brutality and neglect toward patients 
at the Blackwell’s Island Insane Asylum in her book Ten Days in a 
Mad-House,50 which led to some reforms. Shortly after the turn of 
the nineteenth century, Upton Sinclair worked in the meatpacking 
industry to reveal conditions difficult for man, woman, and animal 
alike in The Jungle.51 Jack London lived like a tramp in London for 
his book, People of the Abyss.52 
Other journalists have gone undercover to report on prison 
conditions in the infamous Sing Sing prison,53 and on religious 
groups, including the Moonies or evangelical Christians.54 Many 
journalists have gone undercover to immerse themselves in groups 
such as the KKK, Nazis in America, and even the Freemasons.55 
More recently, Craig Unger went undercover to imbed himself with 
evangelical supporters of George W. Bush and Mike Huckabee.56 
James O’Keefe has also used undercover techniques—such as hidden 
cameras—to embarrass political opponents such as ACORN.57 
C. Animal Rights Activists 
Recently, animal rights activists have increasingly turned to 
undercover work to expose animal abuse at farms. Mercy for 
Animals, the Humane Society of the United States, and PETA 
 
rather played on expectations that they belonged in the hospital. KROEGER, supra note 45, 
at 1–5. 
 48. KROEGER, supra note 45, at 15–19. 
 49. Id. 
 50. NELLIE BLY, TEN DAYS IN A MAD-HOUSE (Norman L. Munro ed., 1887). 
 51. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). 
 52. JACK LONDON, PEOPLE OF THE ABYSS (1903). 
 53. TED CONOVER, NEWJACK: GUARDING SING SING (2000). 
 54. DECEPTION FOR JOURNALISM’S SAKE: A DATABASE, 
http://dlib.nyu.edu/undercover/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
 55. KROEGER, supra note 45, at 209. 
 56. CRAIG UNGER, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF BUSH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW 
A BAND OF TRUE BELIEVERS SEIZED THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, STARTED THE IRAQ WAR, AND 
STILL IMPERILS AMERICA’S FUTURE (2007). 
 57. Zev Chafets, Stinger: James O’Keefe’s Greatest Hits, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2011, 
at MM16. 
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have posted on their websites scores of video showing the 
abuse of animals. These videos have led in some cases to 
prosecution of individuals abusing the animals and to 
decisions by large food corporations to stop sourcing their 
food from certain factories or slaughterhouses. 58 
These undercover operations have been so successful that 
eight states have passed some type of “Ag-gag” laws that impose 
special criminal penalties against activists for lying on resumes to 
get jobs at farms or slaughterhouses, for secretly videotaping 
such facilities, and even for publishing or broadcasting those 
videos.59 These states have therefore superseded ordinary trespass 
laws for far more targeted laws. 
Similarly, anthropologists have gone undercover, much as Upton 
Sinclair did one hundred years ago, to work at chicken or beef 
processing plants, later relating their experiences in books or 
articles.60 These hybrid reporter/anthropologists did not secretly 
film but rather simply reported in writing what they saw (and 
smelled). 
D. Civil Rights Testers 
Lawyers have used civil rights “testers” to determine whether 
realtors, for example, discriminate against minorities in housing. 
They have set up identities for a black couple and a white couple that 
are very similar in background, jobs, earning power, etc., and 
different only in race.61 These controlled experiments have often 
shown realtors steering blacks to black neighborhoods or whites to 
white neighborhoods.  Alternatively, they have shown realtors telling 
 
 58. Paul Solotaroff, In the Belly of the Beast, ROLLING STONE MAG., Dec. 10, 2013, 
available at http://feature. rollingstone.com/feature/belly-beast-meat-factory-farms-
animal-activists. 
 59. E.g., IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2012); Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The 
Unconstitutionality of Laws Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10960 (2012). 
 60. See TIMOTHY PACHIRAT, EVERY TWELVE SECONDS: INDUSTRIALIZED 
SLAUGHTER AND THE POLITICS OF SIGHT (2011); STEVE STRIFFLER, CHICKEN: THE 
DANGEROUS TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S FAVORITE FOOD (2005); Ted Conover, The 
Way of All Flesh, HARPER’S MAG., May 2013, available at 
http://harpers.org/archive/2013/05/the-way-of-all-flesh/. 
 61. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 (1982); Robert Thomas 
Roos, No Harm, No Fraud: The Invalidity of State Fraud Claims Brought Against Employment 
Testers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1687 (2000). 
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black people nothing is available while telling white couples 
something is. 
E. Professional Organizations 
Professional organizations that oversee many of the professions 
described above—journalists, anthropologists, lawyers, and police—
have explored and debated the ethics of using undercover techniques 
in their fields. I sketch here, very briefly, those ethical guidelines 
merely as further background to the use of undercover work. 
Journalists have developed non-binding factors for when they 
can or should use deception. The Society for Professional Journalists 
Code of Ethics, for example, simply urges reporters to avoid 
undercover work unless traditional methods will fail to disclose 
“information vital to the public.”62 
Other journalists have taken a stricter stance, arguing that 
reporters should use hidden cameras only in exceptional 
circumstances, such as for stories “of great public interest” that 
involve either “great harm to individuals or a system failure at the 
highest level.” They should also be a tactic of “last resort.”63 
On the other hand, in her recent and comprehensive book, 
Undercover Reporting: The Truth about Deception, Brooke Kroeger 
urges reporters to return to more robust use of this technique, 
surveying the long history of great progressive changes wrought by 
such deceptive work.64 
Sociologists and anthropologists have also debated undercover 
fieldwork for decades.65 While the code of ethics of their institutional 
bodies would largely ban66 undercover work that investigates the 
 
 62. SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, 
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
 63. Bob Steele, ABC and Food Lion: The Ethics Question, THE POYNTER INSTITUTE, 
Aug. 25, 2002, available at http://www.poynter.org/uncategorized/2125/abc-and-food-
lion-the-ethics-questions/. 
 64. KROEGER, supra note 45, at 294–95.  
 65. E.g., Charlotte Allen, Spies Like Us: When Sociologists Deceive Their Subjects, LINGUA 
FRANCA, Nov. 1997, available at 
http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9711/9711.allen.html (summarizing the debate and 
describing in particular the negative effects of Carolyn Ellis’ undercover field research for her 
book Guineamen, Fisher Folk, which made the locals look backward and criminal). 
 66. Am. Anthropological Ass’n, Statement on Ethics: Principles of Professional 
Responsibility, 2012, http://ethics.aaanet.org/category/statement/ (deception, particularly 
that which affects decisions to participate in research, is “ethically problematic”); AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE ASA 
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wrongdoing of the person deceived, some anthropologists often do 
continue to investigate undercover, such as Steve Striffler67 working 
at a chicken processing plant; Timothy Pachirat68 working at a beef 
processing plant; and Ted Conover working at Sing Sing Prison69 
and, more recently, at a meat processing plant.70 When working in 
these hybrid anthropologist/reporter capacities, the authors consider 
ethical obligations but largely conclude the tactic is justified by some 
combination of the following factors: they do not name the 
individuals they encounter or, in some cases, the business itself; they 
observe what any employee would observe; and undercover work is 
the only way to disclose vital information about pervasively bad 
conditions (for animals and human beings) on a matter of important 
public interest.71 
Lawyers who oversee the civil rights testers discussed above are 
subject to ethics rules and guidelines prohibiting dishonest conduct 
in general.72 Thus, the question arises: can lawyers ethically supervise 
such techniques? Bar associations and courts have often approved 
lawyers using deception in sending civil rights testers to realtors or 
others to establish violations of civil rights laws, as weighed against 
lawyers’ ethical obligations to be honest; however, other state courts 
have seemingly rejected such deception.73 
Finally, law enforcement agencies such as the FBI have developed 
guidelines governing the appropriate use of undercover work, which 
require a balancing of risks, such as harm to individuals or 
 
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS § 12.05 (1999) (banning significant deception or 
concealing of identity if it would cause more than minimal risk to the research participant). 
 67. STRIFFLER, supra note 60. 
 68. PACHIRAT, supra note 60. 
 69. CONOVER, supra note 53. 
 70. Conover, supra note 60. 
 71. PACHIRAT, supra note 60; STRIFFLER, supra note 60. 
 72. See, eg., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (2015) (“It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”). 
 73. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 8.4 REGULATING LAWYERS’ SUPERVISION OF UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS, 
available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072162-
ProposedAmendmenttoProfessionalConductRule8.4lawyerssupervisionofundercoverinvestigati
ons.pdf. (collecting sources and noting conflicting rules and advice). 
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businesses—including financial harm and invasion of privacy—and 
benefits of the operation.74 
These ethical guidelines do not focus on trespass in particular 
but rather assess the propriety of deception in general. Nevertheless, 
they provide a good sense of the general view of the institutional 
leaders, even if that view is often ignored by the actual practitioners 
in the field. 
F. Media Scholars 
Numerous media scholars have grappled with the more general 
problem of reporters’ use of deception, whether in the context of 
trespass or not.75 For example, NBC’s To Catch a Predator used 
undercover investigators posing as underage girls to lure potential 
pedophiles to their home, where they met NBC’s Chris Hansen 
instead. This use of undercover reporting did not involve trespass or 
any apparent violation of the law. One target did later kill himself, 
however, leading to a lawsuit and further discussion by scholars and 
media ethicists as to the proper use of deception by journalists.76 
These media scholars have generally tried to establish legal 
frameworks that would address intrusive reporting techniques 
involving not only deception but spying as well, both in private and 
public places.77 They therefore focus more upon weighing the 
reporters’ interests in uncovering important information against the 
targets’ interest in privacy, usually meaning the tort of intrusion 
upon seclusion. Some scholars urge greater legal restraints on 
deceptive techniques,78 while others propose greater freedoms 
 
 74. UNDERCOVER AND SENSITIVE OPERATIONS UNIT, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS, Revised Nov. 13, 1992, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/undercover-and-sensitive-operations-unit-attorney-generals-
guidelines-fbi-undercover-operations. 
 75. KROEGER, supra note 45; LeBel, supra note 25, at 1158; Lidsky, supra note 25. 
 76. Fargo, supra note 34, at 1094 (citing e.g., Douglas McCollam, The Shame Game: ‘To 
Catch a Predator’ Gets the Ratings, But at What Cost?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 
2007, at 28). 
 77. E.g., Lidsky, supra note 25. 
 78. E.g., Ethan E. Litwin, The Investigative Reporter’s Freedom and Responsibility: 
Reconciling Freedom of the Press with Privacy Rights, 86 GEO. L. J. 1093, 1099–1100 (1998) 
(urging courts to review journalists’ undercover techniques that invade privacy with a least-
restrictive alternative test, under which the Food Lion producers would be liable). 
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through a constitutional privilege for newsgathering.79 These 
different views represent the difficult values on both sides, balancing 
a robust press with important privacy rights. 
Not surprisingly, these scholars focus on the tort of privacy and 
usually do not discuss trespass per se in any great detail. Their 
mission differs significantly from mine. They seek to create an overall 
framework for journalists’ various newsgathering techniques. I seek 
to determine the best trespass rule from the civil tort arena to then 
apply to law enforcement cases. To the extent that scholars such as 
Ben Depoorter80 urge an erosion of trespass to afford greater media 
access, this Article tackles those proposals below. 
But with a focus on privacy torts, journalists’ work plays an 
important role for this Article in establishing a threshold principle: 
any tort remedy for intrusive or deceptive media techniques, even 
sounding in privacy, should compensate for damages arising from the 
newsgathering techniques rather than for the content of the 
publication.81 Libel, with its built-in First Amendment protections, 
should represent the sole remedy for damages arising from the 
content of the publication, at least for the kind of cases discussed in 
this Article.82 
This threshold principle—limiting damages for reporters’ use of 
deception to newsgathering techniques rather than the content of 
the publication—dovetails perfectly with a trespass rule that limits 
remedies to nominal and actual damages from the trespass itself. 
Trespass law coincidentally proscribes compensation for the 
downstream harm arising from (truthful) publication of what the 
reporters learned. 
II. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY 
This Part examines police deception under the old Fourth 
Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to show how 
generously that test views police deception, especially regarding lies 
 
 79. Fargo, supra note 34, at 1095 (summarizing both camps); LeBel, supra note 25, at 
1154 (proposing a constitutional privilege for newsgathering using deception based upon a 
balance between property rights and society’s interest). 
 80. Depoorter, supra note 25, at 1119.  
 81. Lidsky, supra note 25, at 197. 
 82. The tort of publication of private facts affords a remedy for the publication, of 
course, but those cases generally involve private and personal facts of little newsworthiness. 
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about both identity and purpose. Parts III and IV show how a Jones-
Jardines trespass test will likely change these outcomes. 
Three key Supreme Court cases have formed the bedrock for 
deception cases: Katz v. United States,83 Lewis v. United States,84 and 
Hoffa v. United States.85 Katz of course explicitly established the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test for determining what counts 
as a search, via the formula announced in Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence, which also noted that a person can enjoy no such 
privacy over matters she has voluntarily exposed to the public.86 Lewis 
and Hoffa, though they predate Katz, have subsequently been 
treated by the Court as having been decided under an expectation of 
privacy rationale.87  I now explain Lewis and Hoffa in further detail 
before exploring their progeny and implications for deceptive 
trespass by police. 
A. Lewis v. United States 
In Lewis, the defendant invited a federal agent, who was 
posing as a drug buyer named “Jimmy the Pollack,” to his home 
to buy marijuana on two occasions. The defendant sought to 
suppress the marijuana, arguing the agent had violated his 
Fourth Amendment right.88 
The Lewis Court refused to find the officer’s ruse violated the 
Fourth Amendment. First, it said that the officer did not observe or 
take anything other than the exact drugs he had bought. The Court 
contrasted this with an earlier case in which officers using a ruse 
ended up ransacking the defendant’s home, conduct which was 
absent in Lewis.89 In some sense the officer in Lewis did not conduct 
a search at all since he did not look for anything; he merely bought 
what was given him.90 The Court similarly noted that it was the 
defendant, not the police, who suggested his home for the 
 
 83. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 84. 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
 85. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 86. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 87. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 88. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 207–08. 
 89. Id. at 209–10 (citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)). 
 90. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210. Justice Marshall later characterizes Lewis in this fashion to 
limit its holding. See Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S. 1045, 1047, 1049 (1981) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (denying cert. to United States v. Baldwin, 621 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1980)). 
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transaction, and from the police point of view, the transaction could 
have taken place anywhere. Second, the Court reasoned that were it 
to hold this type of undercover buy unlawful, it would invalidate 
nearly all undercover work.91 
Third, the Court held that the defendant had essentially 
converted his home into a place of business—indeed, into a 
“commercial center”—where outsiders were invited to buy drugs. 
The defendant had thereby lost any special Fourth Amendment 
protection for the home, enjoying no greater “sanctity” than a store. 
Justice Brennan in concurrence emphasized that the defendant had 
lost any right to “privacy” by opening his home as a business.92 
The Court in Lewis, however, expressed limits. It said that each 
case of deception must be assessed on its own facts.93 Although it 
noted that deception becomes necessary to uncover certain types of 
crime, it listed those crimes in which ordinarily both participants are 
willing to conduct the transaction.94 With no victim to report certain 
types of crime, deception becomes one of the few ways to uncover 
them, or so the Court hints. 
Also, though not stressed in the opinion, the Court nevertheless 
mentioned that the defendant conceded that the narcotics agent had 
probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant before he arrived at the 
home.95 Indeed, in general, when a defendant invites an officer to his 
home to buy drugs, those facts establish probable cause. This is 
significant because it shows that when police enter to conduct the 
very transaction proposed by the defendant, they will usually have 
probable cause. This reduces our fear of a fishing expedition or 
arbitrary harassment that arises when the police use the ruse of a 
lawful transaction, such as delivering a legitimate package, simply to 
gain entry to the home to look for contraband. 
Lewis is thus as significant for its implied limits as for its holding. 
It authorized entry based upon a ruse when the transaction itself was 
unlawful, the defendant himself proposed the home as the location, 
and the defendant essentially converted his home to a “commercial 
center.” It seems Lewis should therefore not apply to situations in 
which the transaction was lawful, when the officer proposed the 
 
 91. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210. 
 92. Id. at 213 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. at 211–12. 
 94. Id. at 209 n.5, 212. 
 95. Id. at 208 n.4. 
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home as the place to conduct the transaction (thus giving rise to the 
presumption the officer seeks to enter the home qua home), or the 
defendant does not regularly use his home to conduct drug sales. 
But many of these salutary limits in Lewis were eliminated by 
another case decided the same day—Hoffa.96 
B. Hoffa v. United States 
In Hoffa, the government was in the process of trying union 
leader James “Jimmy” Hoffa for violating federal labor laws. During 
the trial, Hoffa set up quarters in a hotel room, which the Court 
treated as enjoying the same protections as the home. Hoffa 
caucused with his advisors and lawyers in the hotel over the several 
weeks of the trial.97 
During the trial, Hoffa permitted a local official of his union, 
Edward Partin, to join him in the hotel room during discussions 
about Hoffa’s trial planning, including Hoffa’s plans to bribe a juror. 
Partin was, of course, a government plant, or so the Court assumed 
in its decision.98 
The jury hung on the trial over the labor violations, but the 
government then brought a bribery case against Hoffa based on 
Partin’s testimony. Hoffa sought to suppress Partin’s testimony. The 
question thus arose: did the government violate the Fourth 
Amendment by placing an informant, posing as a friend, in Hoffa’s 
hotel room?99 
The Court answered no, the government did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment by placing an informant in a person’s hotel 
room, or home, if the person invites the informant, mistakenly 
believing him to be a friend.100 Such cases are now known as false-
friend cases.101 As in Lewis, the Hoffa Court did not mention trespass 
but rather analyzed the conduct essentially under a privacy test. The 
Court held that the police conduct did not violate Hoffa’s 
 
 96. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 97. Id. at 294–304. 
 98. Id. at 295–98. 
 99. Id. at 294–300. 
 100. Id. at 302–03. 
 101. Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False 
Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253, 255 & n.12 (2006). 
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“security,”102 or what later cases describe as a reasonable or legitimate 
expectation of privacy.103 
To understand how placing an informant, who appears to be a 
friend, into a hotel room or a home does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, we must follow the Hoffa Court through several 
convoluted steps. 
Step one: it would not have violated the Fourth Amendment had 
Partin really been a friend of Hoffa’s who entered innocently enough and 
only went to the authorities after he learned of Hoffa’s plot to bribe 
jurors. In fact, Hoffa knew of this possibility; Partin, like any friend, could 
betray him by reporting him to the authorities afterwards.104 
Step two: Hoffa therefore forfeited his privacy, or “security” as 
the Court put it, with respect to Partin.105 
Step three: Hoffa likewise enjoyed no privacy when he assumed 
the risk that Partin may have been a government agent in the first 
place. This last implicit but necessary step, of course, widens Hoffa’s 
forfeiture of privacy not only as to a real friend who later betrays 
him, but also as to anyone who appears to be a friend but is really a 
government informant. Many scholars argue this final step gets 
privacy wrong.106 Regardless, after Hoffa, that is how privacy would 
work under the Fourth Amendment. 
Hoffa thus broadens the ways in which Lewis endorsed 
deception. Chief Justice Warren, who wrote the majority opinion in 
Lewis, dissented in Hoffa.107 Hoffa no longer requires, as Lewis 
apparently had, that the purpose for which the government 
informant entered be unlawful. Rather, an informant may use the 
ruse to enter simply as a friend to collect whatever evidence of crime 
appears—or at least whatever the informant hears. There need not be 
probable cause to believe the person might be committing a crime, 
 
 102. Id. at 301–03. 
 103. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (citing Hoffa for the proposition 
that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties.”). 
 104. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302–03. 
 105. Id. at 302. 
 106. Sherry Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment 
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 139 (2002) (criticizing the false 
friend cases such as Hoffa as treating “risk-taking as tantamount to an invitation”). 
 107. Chief Justice Warren deemed the Fourth Amendment challenge serious but instead 
would have reversed the conviction on the grounds that Partin was a completely unreliable 
witness. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 316. 
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as there was at least factually in Lewis.108 And the defendant need not 
have converted his home—or hotel room here—into a “commercial 
center” to lose that particular protection the Fourth Amendment 
affords the home. 
Hoffa stands out for its formalism. It moves from one technical 
logical step to the next, from a person assuming the risk that a friend 
might report him to the police to assuming that friend might be a 
government informant in the first place. The Court does not discuss 
the role of privacy in our lives or vis-a-vis the government; it does 
not discuss or attempt to define the appropriate role the Fourth 
Amendment should play in patrolling the divide between 
government and criminal defendants; and it does not even discuss 
basic practical or policy questions as to why its rule will result in 
good outcomes.109 
Nevertheless, we may discern one possible limit in Hoffa based 
on its facts: the government may rely upon an informant only if he is 
a pre-existing friend of the defendant, but the government may not 
place an actual government agent into a home posing as someone 
else with a different purpose. The Court in Hoffa expressly reserved 
this question,110 but of course, later cases would attempt to construe 
precisely whether Hoffa contains such limit, as discussed below. 
C. Subsequent Law Enforcement Cases 
I divide the case law below into four main categories: (i) the 
Lewis-type case, in which the transaction used to enter the home is 
the very transaction under investigation and is potentially illegal; (ii) 
coercion cases, such as Bumper v. North Carolina,111 in which the 
police do not lie about their identity, but lie about having a warrant 
or an emergency; (iii) the Hoffa–type cases, in which the police or an 
informant lie about both their identity and purpose; and finally, (iv) 
 
 108. The Court noted the authorities had some suspicion Hoffa might bribe jurors but 
does not suggest they had probable cause or really any specific grounds for their suspicion. Id. 
at 296.  
 109. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in United States v. White, attacks the Court for 
employing a “legalistic” reasoning rather than assessing the role wiretapping might play in an 
open democracy and how it might smother the freedom privacy protects to engage in 
spontaneous conversation. 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971). 
 110. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 n.6 (“The applicability of the Fourth Amendment if 
Partin had been a stranger to the petitioner is a question we do not decide.”). 
 111. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
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cases in which law enforcement enter a business posing as an 
ordinary customer. 
1. Lewis-type cases 
Numerous recent cases have applied Lewis to endorse controlled 
deliveries112 of contraband such as drugs, allowing the police to enter 
the home to make the delivery without violating the Fourth 
Amendment113 and use evidence against the defendant that he 
willingly received the package. These cases parallel Lewis because the 
transaction itself is likely illegal. I say likely because the defendant 
may not have asked for the package as expressly as did the defendant 
in Lewis. In other words, the transaction itself does not automatically 
amount to a crime if the defendant did not order the package and 
merely accepts it without knowing its contents. Nevertheless, courts 
extend Lewis to allow these deliveries.  Courts also go beyond Lewis 
in these cases to permit officers, once invited into the home, to 
observe contraband in plain view and use that information to obtain 
a search warrant.114 
2. Bumper-type cases 
In the Bumper v. North Carolina115 line of cases, police lie in such 
a way that the resident feels no choice but to allow the search. In 
Bumper itself, the Court held that the police cannot lie and say they 
have a search warrant when they do not. If a homeowner consents to 
their entry to his home, the ruse vitiates that consent and the entry 
violates the Fourth Amendment. The assertion of a warrant amounts 
to coercion. 
Courts have extended the Bumper coercion principle to hold that 
when the police lie about an emergency, such as a kidnapping,116 a 
 
 112. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 769–70 (1983) (describing widespread use of 
controlled deliveries). 
 113. See United States v. Santiago, 828 F.2d 866 (1st Cir. 1987); Hrubec. v. United 
States, 734 F. Supp. 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 114. See United States v. Wagner, 884 F.2d 1090, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 1989) (officer 
posing as UPS agent made controlled delivery of drug-making equipment and smelled the 
cooking of meth); United States v. Turner, 491 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007) (anticipatory 
search warrant). 
 115. 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
 116. See United States v. Vazquez-Velazquez, No. 1:11–CR–212–TCB–GGB, 2012 WL 
917845, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
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gas leak,117 or a plumbing leak,118 in order to get into a home to look 
for evidence of other crimes, such tactics also amount to a type of 
coercion vitiating consent. These cases, of course, involve lies only 
about the police’s purpose and not about their identity. 
The Ninth Circuit has identified a second reason to hold these 
deceptions unconstitutional beyond coercion: it would be unfair for 
the homeowner to trust the government official qua government 
official only to have that trust betrayed.119 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that a ruse by an official identifying himself as such will trigger 
the Fourth Amendment, even though the same ruse by an official 
disguising his identity as well will not.120 
3. Hoffa-type cases 
When the police disguise their identity and purpose, the 
homeowner may feel less, if any, coercion, and so courts cannot 
simply say the consent is vitiated as not voluntary. When the police 
pose as a UPS agent delivering a real package, or as potential 
homebuyers, the consent is entirely voluntary. The problem in these 
case, rather, is whether the consent is vitiated by the deception. 
Courts generally approve police deception in this category, even 
though the police lie about their identity and purpose, and even 
though they use a perfectly legal transaction—such as delivering a 
real package to gain entry. As noted above, the courts say such 
deceptive entries do not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.121 
Though the defendant in Hoffa opened his hotel room to a known 
friend, later cases extend the rationale to any stranger; it does not 
matter, the courts hold, that the stranger turns out to be a police 
officer rather than a real UPS driver.122 
In United States v. Miglietta, for example, the court reasoned 
that because the police entered for the exact transaction for which 
 
 117. See People v. Jefferson, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (App. Div. 1973). 
 118. See United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 418–19 (6th Cir. 2008) (landlord 
entering apartment to search at behest of police claiming plumbing leak). 
 119. United States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 120. Id. at 115–16. 
 121. Again, though Hoffa did not rest explicitly on an expectation-of-privacy rationale, 
later cases, including those in the Supreme Court, reinterpreted it based upon a reasonable or 
legitimate expectation of privacy. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
 122. See e.g., United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Miglietta, 507 F. Supp. 353 (M.D. Fla. 1980); People v. Lucatero, 166 Cal. App. 4th 
1110 (2008). 
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they were admitted, they did not exceed the scope of their 
permission.123 The police officer who entered disguised as a UPS 
employee saw no more than the UPS employee would have in the 
scope of his delivery. And left unsaid, but perhaps implied, the UPS 
employee could report the drugs to the police anyway.  
Similarly, in People v. Lucatero, a police officer posed as a 
homebuyer and entered the defendant’s home, where he observed 
evidence that allowed him to get a search warrant for drugs.124  
Guidry v. State had similar facts, but provided a more substantial 
analysis.125 There, wildlife protection officers gained entry by 
implying they were interested in buying the home. Once inside, the 
officers found moose bones leading to a conviction for taking a 
moose out of season. The defendant sought relief under the Alaska 
Constitution, arguing that courts should adopt a bright-line rule that 
ruses using innocent transactions to gain entry to look for evidence, 
unlike the illegal transaction in Lewis, are unconstitutional. The 
Alaska Supreme Court rejected the proposed distinction, relying 
rather upon a general conception of fairness by balancing the needs 
of law enforcement to use undercover tactics against potential abuse 
and government oppression. The court found the undercover 
deception fair, in part because the officers did not affirmatively 
misrepresent themselves (though they knew the homeowner 
mistakenly thought they were potential homebuyers) and did not 
originally approach the home with the intent to enter by deception. 
a. United States v. Baldwin. 
One of the more disturbing cases in the Hoffa line, United States 
v. Baldwin,126 deserves special treatment because of the level of 
intrusion and the somewhat bizarre facts. Baldwin involved a deep-
cover operation without a warrant, in which an officer not only 
gained employment by ruse but began living with the suspect as well. 
Arthur Baldwin owned several local nightclubs in Memphis, 
including several Playgirl clubs. The Memphis police assigned Officer 
Joseph Hoing to conduct surveillance of the defendant and his clubs. 
Officer Hoing befriended the defendant, becoming both his 
 
 123. Miglietta, 507 F. Supp. at 355–56. 
 124. Lucatero, 166 Cal. App. 4th at 1113. 
 125. 671 P.2d 1277 (Alaska 1983). 
 126. United States v. Baldwin, 621 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1980).  
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chauffeur and general handyman for roughly six months. He also 
worked at one of the Playgirl clubs, as bartender and then manager. 
Finally, he moved in with the defendant, living in a downstairs 
bedroom. While living there for several months, he had free access to 
the entire place, including the defendant’s bedroom. 
Officer Hoing took full advantage of this access, collecting 
cocaine residue from a tabletop in Baldwin’s bedroom and the 
floorboard of the defendant’s car, as well as some cocaine the 
defendant asked him to retrieve from his dresser drawer. Each of the 
collections resulted in separate drug convictions. At his trial, Baldwin 
asked the court to suppress the cocaine, arguing Hoing had violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights. 
The trial court rejected Baldwin’s argument and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed, finding that Hoing had not conducted a Fourth 
Amendment search under Lewis and Hoffa. As in Lewis, the Sixth 
Circuit said the defendant had invited Hoing into his home, thereby 
assuming the risk Hoing was an undercover police officer. The court 
extended Lewis, of course, beyond entry based on an illegal 
transaction to entry based upon an innocent transaction—here 
simply becoming housemates. The Sixth Circuit also extended Hoffa 
from the entry of a pre-existing friend who was also a government 
informant to an actual undercover police officer who had no pre-
existing relationship with the defendant. Moreover, as the dissent to 
the denial of a motion to reconsider noted, Hoffa involved merely 
repeating conversations, whereas this case involved a practical fishing 
expedition for tangible evidence and contraband.127 
But perhaps most problematic was the extremely formalistic 
reasoning in Baldwin. The Sixth Circuit simply took one 
questionable logical step after another: first, a person should expect 
that someone  seeking work or housing might report observations of 
wrongdoing to the police;  and second, that person might be an 
informant or a police officer. Each step itself might seem sensible, 
but taken together, they led to a bizarre result. The court blinked 
reality: commonsense tells us the government surely oversteps its 
bounds when it inserts a police officer into a person’s work, car, 
home, and bedroom for months on end with no pre-existing 
 
 127. United States v. Baldwin, 632 F.2d 1, 1–2 (6th Cir. 1980), denying reconsideration, 
(Jones, J., dissenting). 
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suspicion128 or warrant, no judicial oversight whatsoever, and all in 
aid of finding cocaine residue on the person’s bedroom table. But 
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, at least in the hands of 
the Sixth Circuit, found the conduct constitutional. 
The extraordinary facts of Baldwin caught the attention of two 
Supreme Court Justices. Though the Court denied cert, Justices 
Marshall and Brennan dissented in separate opinions.129 Despite the 
extreme facts, the dissenters struggled to identify where the Sixth 
Circuit had gone wrong, precisely, because it was following precedent 
to its logical conclusion. Justice Marshall, for example, argued that the 
case fell outside the Lewis rule, because in Lewis, the claim was merely 
that the officer entered the premises by ruse, not that he had 
conducted a search there, whereas Officer Hoing had searched 
Baldwin’s home. But under Hoffa, Officer Hoing was largely within 
his rights; if a false-friend can listen to and report on conversations, 
surely he can similarly observe and seize drugs in plain view. 
4. Business-entry cases 
The foregoing cases addressed police deception used to gain 
entry into a home, perhaps the most troubling type of intrusion. 
Businesses open to the public130 present fewer concerns, at least 
under a privacy test, since our intuitions largely align with the 
Court’s holdings that such businesses enjoy far less, if any, 
expectation of privacy.  Thus, for businesses open to the public, the 
Court has held that officers posing as customers may enter as may 
anyone else, without a warrant or probable cause, even if their 
purpose deviates from that of a customer: that is, to investigate crime 
rather than to buy something.131   
For example, in Maryland v. Macon, the Court approved of 
plain-clothes officers entering an adult bookstore to look for 
 
 128. The Sixth Circuit appears to assume there was no suspicion. The holding would 
permit the same conduct even if there was no suspicion. 
 129. Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S. 1045 (1981). 
 130. The types of businesses that count as open to the public come as very little surprise, 
including bus terminals, car repair shops, used car lots, parking lot, docks, real estate offices, 
motels, hospitals, pool halls, and restaurants. See WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.4(b) (footnotes omitted). 
 131. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (“respondent did not have any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of the store where the public was invited to enter and 
to transact business”); Marshall v. Barlow, 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978) (dicta); United States v. 
Berrett, 513 F.2d 154, 155–56 (1st Cir. 1975) (commercial garage); LAFAVE, supra note 130. 
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unlawful obscene material in plain view.132 On the other hand, the 
Court recognized that government agents may not enter private 
portions of businesses where only employees may enter.133 
III. TRESPASS AND CONSENT 
Before we can answer whether a trespass test would change the 
police deception cases, we must first decide what the law of trespass 
says about deception. By deception, I mean a lie about both identity 
and purpose specifically in order to gain entry. Though the simplest 
rule would be to find that such deceptions always vitiate consent, I 
propose a more nuanced rule that captures the core of trespass but 
accommodates important precedent. 
My claim: a deception used to gain entry to look around, or 
listen, for evidence of wrongdoing—a potential fishing expedition—
vitiates consent and makes the intrusion a trespass. In law 
enforcement, this would require overruling cases such as Hoffa, 
Baldwin, and the Miglietta UPS case. In the journalism cases, it 
would require modifying Food Lion as detailed below to make even 
the initial entry a trespass. Animal rights activists who lie to gain 
employment would likewise trespass. 
But my claim includes an important limit: a trespass of the Lewis 
variety, in which the intruder gains entry merely to consummate the 
unlawful or potentially unlawful transaction, will not count as a 
trespass. This exemption would retain the important Lewis line of 
cases, as well as recognize the lawfulness of the techniques used in 
Desnick and by civil rights testers. In tester cases, the tester lies not in 
order to gain entry somewhere but rather in order to carry out the 
transaction that itself is under investigation.134 
This Part therefore proceeds in two steps. First, Part III.A 
defends a broader rule: that deception always vitiates consent. It 
points to other areas of law such as fraud, informed consent, and 
most trespass cases. I also consider the equally confusing rape-by-
deception cases to demonstrate its place within the broader rule. 
I then tackle Food Lion and Desnick, showing why Food Lion 
makes no sense but Desnick can be harmonized with my overall 
 
      132.   Maryland, 472 U.S. at 469. 
  133. See id. 
 134. See infra Part III.D. 
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trespass claim. As part of that discussion, I defend my Lewis/Desnick 
exception to a general rule that deception vitiates consent. 
A. General Tort Principles and Cases 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides an easy rule that 
would find trespass in almost all the entries by deception considered 
here. The Restatement simply says that consent is not valid if the 
person is substantially mistaken about the nature of the intrusion, 
and the intruder is aware of this mistake.135 
The key questions, of course, are deciding (1) what kind of 
mistake is “substantial,” and (2) what counts as the “nature” of the 
intrusion. Most courts136 and scholars137 agree that we should answer 
these questions in relation to the interests protected by the 
underlying right. In many other areas of law—such as fraud, 
informed consent, and rape-by-deception—deception vitiates 
consent if it misleads a person about a substantial fact relevant to the 
underlying right. 
1. Fraud 
When a person affirmatively lies to induce another to act in 
reliance, such as to buy a car, the lie will lead to damages if it causes 
pecuniary harm.138 That is, the lie must relate to the interest fraud 
protects: money. 
Similarly, when a person omits information, that information 
must be material to lead to fraud.139 But the same principle still 
applies to materiality: courts define materiality in relation to the 
interests fraud protects—again, generally money. In securities fraud, 
for example, courts assess materiality based on the significance a 
reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misleading 
 
 135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1979) (“If the person consenting 
to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning the nature 
of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake 
is known to the other or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, the consent is not 
effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.”). 
 136. E.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 137. E.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 23. 
 138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 525 (1979). 
 139. Id. § 550 (1979). 
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information.140 But this materiality concerns the value of the stock 
only; that is simply what fraud has traditionally been understood to 
protect.141 Even if an individual investor thought a company’s lies 
about its human rights record were important, that alone would not 
make the information material, assuming a bad human rights record 
would not affect the value of the stock.142 
By contrast, in the context of a charity, the very purpose is to 
help people. So a lie about whether an individual’s donated money 
actually does help anyone will count as fraud.143 For example, a 
telemarketer’s claim that a significant amount of a donation would 
go to charity when only 15% did (while the rest would go to the 
telemarketers) would provide a basis for a fraud claim. Again, we 
assess the materiality of the lie used to gain consent in light of the 
interests of the underlying transaction. 
2. Informed consent 
In the context of informed medical consent, a person is entitled 
to know the facts relevant to the medical procedure before 
consenting to that procedure. Some courts restrict this rule to facts a 
reasonable patient would wish to know,144 and others further limit 
relevant facts to those relating to the nature of the procedure, risks 
and benefits, and alternatives.145 Regardless, what counts as material 
must be viewed in line with the underlying interest of informed 
consent: recognizing a patient’s right to weigh for him or herself at 
least some minimum set of relevant risks and benefits. 
In most informed consent cases, the doctor is a real doctor; that 
is, she does not deceive the patient about her identity. Rather, she 
fails to secure informed consent when she fails to supply complete 
information. But, as relevant to this Article, what about cases in 
 
 140. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (concluding that information must 
be viewed in context of the “total mix.”); Litwin v. Blackstone Group, L.P. 634 F.3d 706 
(2d Cir. 2011). 
 141. See Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as 
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1323 (2012). 
 142. Id. But see Rachel Cherington, Securities Laws and Corporate Responsibility: Toward 
an Expanded Use of Rule 10B-5, 25 UNIV. OF PA. J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 1439 (2004). 
 143. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 616–
18 (2003). 
 144. White v. Leimbach, 959 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (Ohio 2011); Willis v. Bender, 596 
F.3d 1244, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 145. Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 18 (Conn. 2006). 
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which a non-doctor poses as a doctor or the patient consents to 
surgery by doctor A, but then doctor B performs the surgery? In 
these cases the courts have held that the deception, or the substantial 
mistake, vitiates consent entirely, and the resulting surgery 
constitutes the tort of battery. No matter how well the fake doctor 
performs the surgery, the patient still has a protectable right to 
decide who invades his or her body.146 Similarly, if a patient consents 
to have one doctor perform the operation but another does, this 
mistake will also vitiate consent entirely and again constitute a 
battery.147 As with trespass to property, the battery affords a similarly 
absolute right to exclude, and to selectively exclude.148 
3. Rape-by-deception 
The general rule arising in the above examples—that deception 
vitiates consent when it relates to the interests the underlying right 
protects—runs into substantial difficulty in the rape-by-deception 
cases. Indeed, much like the journalism deception cases, courts seem 
to depart from the general rule that deception vitiates consent for 
reasons that lie outside ordinary tort principles.149 Rape, of course, 
results in severe criminal punishment; it has a peculiar history all of 
its own, including the protection of a woman’s virtue and 
autonomy;150 and it may therefore depart from the ordinary rule for 
these reasons alone. 
Take several examples of lies that seem material, induce reliance, 
and would, in other contexts, vitiate consent. When a man lies and 
says he is unmarried or is a doctor, and a woman has sex with him 
because of this lie, courts have almost uniformly held this conduct 
does not constitute rape.151 The woman consented to have sex, she 
knew the nature of what she was consenting to, and the courts 
generally view the lie to concern a fact not relevant to the decision to 
 
 146. Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of Am., 243 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 1957). 
 147. Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1983); Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, 
Recovery by patient on whom surgery or other treatment was performed by on other than the 
physician who patient believed would perform it, 39 A.L.R.4th 1034 (1985). 
 148. Perna, 457 A.2d at 440. 
 149. Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 1395–96; Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. 
Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud as a Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 NW. U. 
L. REV. 75, 77–78 (2007); B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by Fraud or Impersonation, 91 
A.L.R.2d 591 (1963) (collecting cases). 
 150. Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 1379. 
 151. Id. at 1397–98; Christopher, supra note 149, at 77–78. 
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have sex. And yet, many would say that whether a man is married is 
very relevant to the decision to have sex. 
In fact, courts have traditionally found that only two main 
categories of deception will support a rape charge. First, if a doctor 
claims that a woman must have sex with him as part of medical 
treatment,152 or claims that he is inserting a medical device when in 
reality he is inserting his penis,153 this conduct does vitiate consent, 
leading to a finding of rape. Second, if a man impersonates a 
woman’s husband and she has sex with him, thinking he is her 
husband, the man has raped her because the consent is invalid.154 
In drawing distinctions between these two categories, courts will 
say that the former is fraud in the inducement and therefore does not 
vitiate consent. The latter cases, the medical cases and the 
impersonation cases, are deemed fraud in the fact and therefore do 
vitiate consent. But numerous courts and scholars have pointed out 
the obvious: the principle does not explain why one should count as 
vitiating consent and the other should not. The principle also does 
not even apply consistently. Why is lying to a woman that the sex is 
needed for medical treatment “fraud in the fact?” The woman still 
knows she is having sex with a man. The same seems to apply to the 
impersonation cases.155 
There may be historical reasons supporting the distinctions 
drawn by the courts; for example, if we see rape as a crime of 
defilement in which a woman has lost her virtue, we can make some 
sense of the distinction.156 But this rule cannot apply today when 
rape relies largely upon determining consent. 
Jed Rubenfeld has prompted a new discussion of rape-by-
deception by arguing that if we take consent seriously as the key 
determiner of rape, then many of the deceptions courts currently 
 
 152. Such a scenario may sound farfetched but becomes more understandable when 
related to children. In Doe v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., a doctor and endocrinologist 
claimed to be conducting a growth study on children when he was, in fact, sexually abusing 
them. 72 A.3d 929 (Conn. 2013) (affirming $2.75 million award against hospital for failure 
to supervise). 
 153. Christopher, supra note 149, at 78 & n.18 (collecting cases). 
 154. See People v. Crippen, 617 N.W.2d 760, 763–64 (Mich Ct. App. 2000) (defendant 
wore mask and posed as victim’s fiancé); Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 1397–98; Christopher, 
supra note 149, at 77–78.  
 155. Christopher, supra note 149, at 85–87; Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 1398–99. 
 156. Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 1388–92. 
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allow would vitiate consent.157 If a woman reasonably relies upon a 
man’s lie that he is not married, or went to Yale, and the man knows 
that she would not have sex with him if she knew the truth, then 
Rubenfeld argues the consent is not valid, and the man knows this. If 
the consent is not valid, why is it not rape? 
Rubenfeld has his own, somewhat eccentric answer: we should 
return to a definition of rape that requires a finding of force.158 
Whether we should adopt this solution and return a force 
requirement of rape is, happily, beyond the scope of this Article. The 
point, however, which both Rubenfeld and his critics agree upon, is 
that if we take consent seriously in the rape context, we must apply 
the same standard for when deception vitiates that consent as we do 
in other areas of law.159 Whether we use a reasonable woman 
standard, or a standard simply assessing whether the man realized the 
woman thought the fact important, we will treat deception as 
material if it is material and not according to some odd set of criteria 
that bear little connection to reality. 
Thus, although the rape-by-deception cases represent an 
exception to the ordinary rule that deception vitiates consent, they 
demonstrate the perils of deviating from that rule. First, courts that 
deviate may well afford women less protection than they deserve 
from men who claim not to be married, for example. Second, the 
deviation from the rule leads to complete doctrinal inconsistency, in 
which some deceptions vitiate consent and others do not, according 
to no rhyme or reason. As we will see below, the same problem has 
vexed courts in the trespass-by-deception cases. 
4. Trespass 
The above areas of law show that not simply any deception 
will vitiate consent, but rather only those deceptions that relate to 
the interests the underlying right protects. Thus, we must 
determine what interests trespass protects. How do we determine 
these? First, we can look at the remedy trespass provides, which 
includes compensation for damages to the land or injury to 
 
 157. Rubenfeld, supra note 23. 
 158. Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 1408–10. 
 159. Tom Dougherty, No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on “Rape-by-
Deception,” 123 YALE L. J. ONLINE 321 (2013), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/12/1/dougherty.html. 
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persons on it. It does not provide real damages for other injury, 
such as invasion of privacy or finding out bad information, as in 
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.160 From this we could 
conclude that a deception vitiates consent only when the intrusion 
ends up damaging the property somehow, physically. Such a rule, 
however, would permit almost all deceptive intrusions and deem 
them not trespasses. 
Limiting the interests trespass protects merely to physical 
damage, simply because that is the only real compensation available 
in a lawsuit, ignores a key feature of trespass: that it provides nominal 
damages for trespasses that cause no harm. Why does it do so? 
Because trespass protects other important interests beyond damage 
to the land, including privacy161 and the right to exclude.162 It 
protects the right to associate with whomever one wishes. It protects 
the right to keep secret one’s business, including meat handling 
(putting aside whether it protects the right to keep secret unlawful 
activity).163  After all, grocery stores that follow the law still do not 
want customers to actually see how the meat is handled and 
prepared. And they have the right to exclude a customer who tries to 
go to the back area to protect this interest, however much we might 
not like it. Trespass, of course, has limits, as discussed below, but 
these limits do not turn on the use of deception. 
Jacque v. Steenburg Homes provides the easiest example.164 
There, a builder of mobile homes sought to deliver a home 
through snowy and treacherous roads. One road presented such a 
challenge that they asked a couple if they could drive the home 
across their open field. The couple refused—they had had a bad 
past experience with adverse possession—but the mobile-
homebuilder drove the home across the fields anyway. The 
trespass caused no damage to the land, but the couple prevailed in 
their trespass suit nonetheless. The court held that trespass 
protects the right to exclude, for any reason or for no reason at 
 
 160. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 514–15 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(imposing nominal damages only); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162. 
 161. De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881); Dolecky v. Borough of 
Riverton, 538 A.2d 856, 860–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); Brush v. Pa. State Univ., 
414 A.2d 48, 52–53 (Pa. 1980). 
 162. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159–60 (Wis. 1997). 
 163. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 524. 
 164. Id. at 157–58; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158. 
SACHAROFF.FINV4 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  3:52 PM 
359 Trespass and Deception 
 393 
all, even if the trespass causes no harm. This rule continued the 
principle from the English common law that a trespass, no matter 
how insignificant, will give rise to at least nominal damages.165 
Trespass thus protects the right to exclude, and the right to 
selectively exclude.166 Even if we were to consider a reasonable person, 
rather than an eccentric, we quickly discover that such a person 
decides whom to exclude based primarily on the identity and 
purpose of the intruder. A resident will invite a friend over for coffee, 
but not to look through his dresser drawers. A resident might invite 
a child and parent into the home for candy on Halloween (that is, 
invite in only those in disguise) but refuse entry to anyone else. In 
assessing the interests trespass protects, we must therefore look at 
the two central reasons a person bases his exclusion upon: identity 
and purpose. 
It takes little further analysis to conclude that when a police 
officer or reporter disguises her identity and purpose, posing as an 
employee or delivery person when in reality investigating 
wrongdoing by the resident or business, their lies induce a 
substantial mistake on the part of the resident or business person. 
The mistake vitiates consent and makes the intrusion trespass. 
Whether we consider a person with something to hide, or even one 
with little to hide, that person is very unlikely to allow police or 
reporters into private areas to simply root around to find some kind 
of wrongdoing. 
Much, or at least some, of the trespass-by-deception case law 
supports this straightforward view that a lie about identity and 
purpose vitiate consent for the intrusion. In Shiffman v. Empire Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield, for example, a reporter posed as a potential 
patient to enter a doctor’s private office. The court held the conduct 
was trespass and the consent invalid because the consent was 
“obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.”167 
 
 165. See Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1763) (“[E]very invasion 
of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass . . . . he is liable to an action, though the 
damage be nothing.”). 
 166. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 305, 322 (1994) (“[T]he right . . . to pick and choose among admittees—is ordinarily 
secured to property owners by trespass law”; arguing for an exception in union organizing 
cases); Commonwealth v. Dow, 3 Pa. D. & C. 4th 283, 289-90 (Pa. C.P. 1989). 
 167. Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 681 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (App. Div. 
1998); see also Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1203 (D. 
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In the Muslim Mafia case, an intern lied on his resume to gain 
entry to the offices of CAIR, the leading Washington, D.C. lobbying 
organization for Muslims, where he taped conversations and stole 
confidential documents.168 The federal district court held the 
complaint stated a claim for trespass premised not only upon the 
stealing of documents and secret taping, but also upon the initial 
entry itself, gained by disguising his identity and purpose.169 
Numerous burglary cases likewise find that the burglar had 
committed the predicate trespass, or breaking and entering, despite 
apparent consent because that consent was obtained by disguising 
one’s purpose or identity.170 In Johnson v. State, for example, the 
defendant was charged with felony murder premised on the burglary 
of a laundromat. The defendant arrived at a locked laundromat and 
pretended to the owner that he wanted change; the owner unlocked 
the door allowing him in. The court held the consent was invalid 
because it was obtained under false pretenses. The court reasoned, 
“Consent obtained by trick or fraud is actually no consent at all and 
will not serve as a defense to burglary.”171 
Other courts have come to similar conclusions, making the entry 
a trespass that will support a burglary charge,172 including a 
defendant who gained entry by making up a story about a surprise 
party,173 or pretending to need the bathroom,174 or pretending to 
have a toothache.175 
Of course, a burglar who lies about a surprise party so he can 
bang a 90-year-old man on the head with a pot, threaten him with a 
 
Ariz. 1998) (finding trespass by undercover reporters, apparently even apart from 
videotaping), aff’d, 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 168. P. DAVID GAUBATZ & PAUL SPERRY, MUSLIM MAFIA: INSIDE THE SECRET 
UNDERWORLD THAT’S CONSPIRING TO ISLAMIZE AMERICA (2009). 
 169. Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 793 F. 
Supp. 2d 311, 345 (D.D.C. 2015); Gaubatz, 793 F. Supp. 2d 311, 345 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 170. E.g. People v. Sipult, 44 Cal. Rptr. 846, 849 (Ct. App. 1965); Johnson v. State, 
921 So. 2d 490, 508 (Fla. 2005); Templeton v. State, 725 So. 2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1998); 
State v. Ortiz, 584 P.2d 1306, 1308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (“[T]he entry is trespassory 
because the entry is based on false consent.”); State v. Keys, 419 P.2d 943, 947–48 (Or. 
1966); State v. Fuller, 296 S.E.2d 871, 871 (S.C. 1982) (claiming car broke down and he 
needed to use phone).  
 171. Johnson, 921 So. 2d at 508. 
 172. See People v. Scott, 787 N.E.2d 205, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 173. See Schrack v. State, 793 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 174. See Alvarez v. State, 768 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 175. See Gordon v. State, 745 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
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knife, and take his money176 commands far less sympathy than police 
or journalists seeking to uncover wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the 
universal rule that applies to burglary—a person who conceals his 
purpose to steal or kill has trespassed—rests on a principle that 
should apply across the board: if the resident had known of the 
hidden purpose, she would have denied entry.177 If the grocery store 
managers in Food Lion, or the person receiving the UPS package in 
Miglietta, had known that the real identity and purpose of the 
intruder was to investigate wrongdoing, they would have likewise 
denied entry. 
B. A More Nuanced Rule: Exception for Tester Cases 
We could end our discussion here with a rule that deception 
always vitiates consent, as it does in many other areas of law, but that 
rule would ignore too much precedent, including important cases 
such as Desnick on the civil trespass side and Lewis on the law 
enforcement side. I will argue in this subpart that the general rule, 
that a lie about identity and purpose vitiates consent, should be 
modified to recognize an exception for what I will call tester-type 
cases. In these cases, the person lies not specifically to enter private 
property, but rather to lure the person into carrying out the 
transaction itself. 
Put even more precisely, however, this exception for tester-type 
cases might not really be an exception at all. Instead, we can cast 
tester-type deception as one not related to the interests trespass 
protects. After all, in the tester-type case, the person lies not exactly 
to enter private property, but to induce the other to carry out the 
transaction; it does not matter where the transaction takes place. As a 
consequence, the deception is not really related to trespass, though it 
involves a trespass. 
But before arriving at this more nuanced deception rule, I 
consider in-depth both the Food Lion and Desnick cases. 
 
 176. See Schrack, 793 So. 2d at 1103. 
 177. See Templeton v. State, 725 So. 2d 764, 767 (“Inasmuch as an owner would not 
knowingly grant someone permission to enter his house with the intent to commit the crime 
of burglary . . . Templeton’s entry was obviously gained by deceit . . . .”). 
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1. Food Lion and the scope test 
The Food Lion case, and others like it,178 hold that while the mere 
lie and entry do not constitute trespass, exceeding the scope of the 
license does. This is true even if the trespasser were who she said she 
was. Thus, in Food Lion, the Fourth Circuit held that the reporters 
had not trespassed when they lied and entered the back area merely 
to observe bad meat-handling practices, because any real employee 
could see the same practices. They did trespass, however, when they 
secretly videotaped, because that conduct exceeded the scope of the 
license given even to real employees.179 Accordingly, we look to the 
scope of the license given by the landowner. 
This scope test would make sense if the test for trespass were 
invasion of privacy. After all, if the undercover employee observes 
only what any other employee observes, then the undercover 
employee has effected no additional invasion of privacy merely by 
observing, or at least arguably so. On the other hand, when the 
undercover employee films, that filming effects an invasion of privacy 
beyond that effected by the real employee. 
But we seek a test that measures whether conduct counts as a 
trespass, not an invasion of privacy; conduct may constitute trespass 
without invading privacy. Whether the reporter films or not, she has 
entered to gather information for broadcast, and any business owner 
would likely wish to exclude that person if they knew their true identity 
and purpose. The filming makes the trespass worse, but it does not 
establish any principled line between a trespass and a non-trespass. 
A simple hypothetical shows why filming should not matter 
under a trespass test. Suppose Sam Donaldson180 himself had shown 
up, announced his identity and intentions, and entered Food Lion 
over the objections of its managers—but without cameras. He 
observes only what an ordinary employee there would observe. 
Nevertheless, he has trespassed. Food Lion can forcibly remove him 
without committing a battery, because trespass justifies reasonable 
physical force used to end the trespass. Food Lion could also sue in 
trespass and recover nominal damages. Whether Donaldson entered 
 
 178. See Pitt Sales, Inc. v. King World Prods., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1365 (S.D. 
Fla. 2005).  
 179. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 518–19 (4th 
Cir. 1999). 
 180. See supra note 26. 
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with cameras or not is irrelevant; either way, he has violated the 
interests trespass protects—the right to exclude, regardless of the level 
of privacy violated. The Fourth Circuit in Food Lion says it applies a 
test based on the interests trespass protects, but it ignores the fact 
that trespass protects the right to exclude for its own sake, and 
selectively, and not simply to protect privacy. 
When we add deception, we see similarly that whether the ABC 
reporters filmed or not should not alter our trespass determination; 
either way they have gained consent through a substantial deception. 
Just as the interests trespass protects against, including the right to 
exclude for any reason or for no reason at all, are violated by Sam 
Donaldson entering openly and without cameras, they are equally 
violated by him entering, without cameras, via a substantial deception. 
But we might identify other more practical reasons to draw the 
line between mere intrusions to observe as any other employee 
would and those involving hidden cameras. For example, perhaps 
such a line would be more administrable, providing a simple 
evidentiary function in dividing real deception from an employee 
whistleblower. But this advantage dissolves upon further 
examination. After all, in most deception cases a potential plaintiff 
generally concedes the intruders were reporters. We do not need any 
secret filming to tell us so.  
The same holds true for undercover police; whether they film or 
merely observe, no one will later dispute in any litigation that they 
were actually police. Thus, at least in cases of institutional players, 
such as law enforcement, mainstream media, civil rights testers 
working for lawyers, and restaurant critics working for newspapers, 
we have no problem distinguishing them from actual employees, 
patients, or customers. Even independent journalists such as James 
O’Keefe are clearly not really who they pretend to be. The only cases 
on the line are writers such as George Orwell181 who serve dual 
purposes of living a life and writing about it. 
Thus, as tempting as the Food Lion scope test seems, deeming an 
intrusion by deception a trespass only when the intruder goes 
beyond even what the disguised person would be permitted to do, 
such as videotape, we must reject it as inconsistent with basic trespass 
 
 181. GEORGE ORWELL, DOWN AND OUT IN PARIS AND LONDON (1933). Orwell 
worked in a restaurant deep in the private recesses of a fancy Paris hotel; he gained entry to this 
private area both in order to write about it and to support himself. 
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principles. Residents and businesses wish to exclude snoops, whether 
they videotape or not.   
2. Desnick v. American Broadcast Company 
Many cases182 such as Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos.183 
fare somewhat better, at least with a little creative interpretation. In 
Desnick, the Seventh Circuit attempted to evaluate the types of 
interests trespass protects and assess whether the intrusion trenched 
upon those interests.184 
Desnick was another ABC Primetime Live hidden camera exposé. 
ABC enlisted elderly individuals to pose as patients seeking advice on 
eye procedures and secretly videotaped Desnick doctors. The test 
patients did not really need cataract surgery, yet doctors at the 
various Desnick clinics told them they did. An independent expert in 
cataract surgery told viewers that in at least one of the test cases 
filmed on hidden camera, continuing with the unneeded procedure 
would have bordered on malpractice. 
The eye clinic sued ABC in trespass, among other claims. The 
Seventh Circuit held that the disguised entry and secret videotaping 
did not constitute trespass because they did not invade any of the 
interests trespass protects: “ownership or possession of the land.” 
This formula does not help very much because “possession” includes 
the right to exclude. Why would that right not include the right 
against deceptive entries? 
But the court in Desnick seemed to believe that trespass protects 
not the abstract right to exclude, but other more tangible, 
measurable interests, such as privacy, or physical harm, or disruption 
of business operations. The court noted, for example, that the 
patients had not invaded any reasonable expectation of privacy, since 
they saw only what any patient would see. It noted the interviews 
largely occurred in areas open to other patients. The investigation 
did not disrupt the business itself.  
True, privacy and smooth business operations are among the 
interests trespass protects. But as discussed above, trespass protects the 
 
 182. Am. Transmission, Inc. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 609 N.W.2d 607, 609–11 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (showing TV producers posing as customers secretly videotaped 
automobile transmission garage). 
 183. Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 184. Id. at 1352–54. 
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right to exclude for its own sake, for any reason or for no reason at all. 
Again, surely the eye clinic could exclude the reporters if they knew 
they were reporters investigating wrongdoing—trespass does protect 
their interest in excluding them simply to avoid the investigation. 
So how can we make sense of Desnick? The court drew analogies 
to other permissible disguised trespasses that perhaps provide clues 
to the rationale underlying its holding. It pointed to restaurant 
critics and civil rights testers as examples of persons whose intrusions 
do not count as trespasses.  
Though the court did not explain why, these examples exemplify 
the transactional, Lewis-type intrusion. As in Lewis, restaurant critics 
and civil rights testers seek entry not to observe other evidence of 
wrongdoing in plain view unrelated to the reason for entering; 
rather, the restaurant critic truthfully says she is there to taste the 
food. The civil rights testing couple likewise enters to investigate the 
very transaction for which it has sought entry. So, when limited, 
Desnick becomes a Lewis-type case. But does even this limited 
version of Desnick accord with ordinary trespass principles? Perhaps. 
The test patients in Desnick commit the deception not exactly to 
gain entry but in order to be diagnosed. The deception relates 
directly to a transaction that could occur anywhere. If we change the 
scenario such that the doctor had come to the test patient’s home to 
make the diagnoses, the effect would have been the same. Similarly, 
civil rights testers could just as easily meet the realtor outside as 
inside the realtor’s office. Nothing depends upon gaining entrance 
to the office. Further, the police officer who seeks to consummate a 
drug transaction can similarly do that anywhere and still accomplish 
his goal; the deception relates to tricking the dealer into dealing with 
the officer, not into letting him in. 
By contrast, cases such as Food Lion and Hoffa involve deceptions 
used to gain entry in order to observe evidence of wrongdoing, or 
hear conversations planning criminal activities. In these cases it does 
matter where the reporters or police enter because the suspect or 
other person under investigation does rely upon her home or private 
business to shield her activities from the public at large. 
Thus, we could distinguish the Desnick case from the Food Lion 
case, and craft a rule that says trespass used to gain entry to observe 
whatever one can, as in Food Lion, constitutes trespass, but 
deceptions that really are used not to gain entry but to trick the 
person into undertaking the very transaction under investigation, 
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such as a drug deal or a potentially faulty diagnoses, will not form 
the basis of trespass. Indeed, this is the course I take, in part for the 
foregoing reasons and in part simply as a compromise with 
precedent, Desnick and Lewis in particular. 
C. Societal Interests 
Ultimately Desnick and Food Lion treat trespass not as an absolute 
and uncrossable barrier, but as a boundary subject to accommodation 
to greater societal interests. Desnick’s focus on civil rights testers points 
out the need for trespass to uncover certain kinds of grave harms. The 
Supreme Court in Lewis similarly noted that the intrusion into the 
home to consummate the drug transaction could be justified by societal 
interests in uncovering a type of crime that is otherwise hard to detect 
because the participants consensually violate the law. The court in Food 
Lion likewise seemed intent on treating trespass not as an absolute but 
as a negotiable barrier depending upon the level of intrusiveness; the 
ABC producers’ entry became trespass only when they secretly filmed. 
These courts recognize that trespass must yield at times to weightier 
societal interests, and of course, laws in other realms categorically 
abridge any right to exclude. Businesses such as hotels and restaurants 
cannot exclude patrons because of race, color, religion, or national 
origin,185 or disability186 under federal law, or for sexual orientation, 
transgender status, or other categories under some state and local 
laws.187 Similarly, firefighters, police, and even private citizens may enter 
a person’s property under state trespass law for emergencies such as 
fires, or to protect the safety of persons from physical abuse—exceptions 
congruent with those under the Fourth Amendment.188 
Courts too have recognized that trespass law must yield to other 
important social interests. In State v. Shack, for example, a lawyer and 
a medical provider entered a farmer’s land to speak with and provide 
legal and medical assistance to migrant workers who lived on the 
property..189 The farmer ordered them off the land, but the visitors 
refused to leave. They were prosecuted for criminal trespass. The 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the trespass statute did not 
 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. 
 187. E.g., N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 (applying to “affectional or sexual orientation . . . gender 
identity or expression”). 
 188. E.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 189. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 370 (N.J. 1971). 
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apply to these circumstances. Trespass law, the court wrote, protects 
important human values, but it has limits, including when outsiders 
must intrude to speak with and assist a vulnerable population such as 
migrant workers in their isolated living quarters.190 
Several scholars have pointed to these exceptions to the trespass 
right to exclude to argue for more exceptions. Cynthia Estlund has 
argued that businesses should not have the right to exclude union 
organizers from coming onto the property to talk to company 
workers.191 Ben Depoorter, in Fair Trespass, has gone so far as to 
argue that journalists, for example, should have a right to trespass if 
it would be in the public interest, apparently whether they use 
deception or not.192 
But as noted in the introduction and throughout this Article, the 
argument for allowing deceptive intrusions based upon society’s needs 
runs into the problem of open trespass. If a reporter openly trespasses 
upon a business, the business owner enjoys a privilege to use physical 
force to remove that reporter, and she enjoys this privilege because the 
reporter has trespassed. Similarly, the business could obtain an injunction 
barring the reporter from returning, an injunction based upon trespass. 
Society’s interests in news do not vitiate the business owner’s trespass 
rights in these open trespass situations. When the reporter obtains 
consent to enter by deception, therefore, this intrusion should not enjoy 
any greater justification because the deception has not increased society’s 
needs, nor has the deception decreased the business owner’s interests in 
exclusion. As a consequence, the same trespass right should apply with or 
without deception. 
Or consider State v. Shack, noted above.  There, the court held 
that the visitors had not trespassed even though their intrusion was 
open and hostile to the landowner. Since society’s interests in 
protecting an insulated and vulnerable population outweighed the 
farmer’s right to exclude, it did not matter whether the visitors had 
trespassed openly, in stealth, or by deception; regardless of the 
manner, the intrusion simply did not constitute trespass. 
 
 190. Id. at 370–72. 
 191. Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 305, 310 (1994). 
 192. Depoorter, supra note 25. 
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D. Tester Exception 
On the other hand, we can justify creating an immunity from 
trespass for tester cases, because we can argue that these do not 
constitute trespass at all. Testers in cases such as Lewis and Desnick 
do not use the deception to enter the premises in particular; each 
investigator would be just as happy to conduct the transaction 
anywhere. If the doctors in Desnick had come to the homes of the 
test patients to make their fraudulent diagnoses there, the result 
would be the same. 
Similarly, in American Transmission, Inc. v. Channel 7 of 
Detroit, Inc., television reporters disconnected a vacuum hose from 
their cars shortly before bringing them to a shop, which then tried 
to get the reporters to pay for unnecessary expensive transmission 
work—on hidden camera, of course.193 The court held under 
Desnick that the intrusion was not trespass.194 Though it largely 
recited the more general incantation that the fake customers had 
not invaded any of the interests trespass protects, we can see this as 
another tester case. If the fake car customers in American 
Transmission had pulled up to the curb of the shop and sought the 
same advice, the outcome would be the same. Entry itself matters 
less than accomplishing the transaction. 
Indeed, the tester cases may not count as trespasses for the 
simple reason that even but-for causation might be lacking. That is, 
in many tester situations the target would still admit the person 
knowing they are testers, only treat them differently once admitted. 
For example, if a restaurant recognizes a food critic, it will likely not 
turn her away but greet her warmly. Likewise, if the mechanics at 
American Transmission knew the truth, they would happily have 
fixed the TV reporters’ cars, on camera by reattaching the 
disconnected vacuum hose, and likely for free and with a smile. Even 
the doctors in Desnick might have welcomed the test patients into 
their clinic and provided them with the good news that they do not 
need cataract surgery. If the targets in these tester cases would still 
have invited the fake customers onto their premises had they known 
the truth, we cannot say the deception vitiated consent—or at least 
not as easily. 
 
 193. Am. Transmission, Inc. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 609 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2000). 
 194. Id. at 614. 
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Exempting testers from trespass does not fit perfectly within a 
pure rule for when deception vitiates consent, but it comes close 
enough for us to adopt it, especially since it enjoys precedential 
support from leading cases such as Desnick and Lewis. 
Some media scholars have made a similar proposal to exclude 
tester cases from trespass violation. Fargo and Alexander, for 
example, propose that journalists should enjoy immunity from 
trespass and other torts if they are acting as “testers.”195 They 
appropriately note that much wrongdoing such as civil rights 
violations by realtors cannot be uncovered without investigators 
posing as homebuyers or renters to ferret out discriminatory 
treatment. So far, so good. 
But unfortunately Fargo and Alexander go on to define tester 
too broadly, as any intruder who seeks to uncover wrongdoing, 
including the journalists in the Food Lion case. By defining “tester” 
so broadly, they uncouple the technique from its central justification: 
that the illegality, or the potential illegality, of the transaction itself 
justifies the intrusion. In paradigmatic tester cases such as Desnick, 
the fake patients enter to consummate the transaction under 
investigation—in that case, a medical diagnosis. But in the Food Lion 
case, which Fargo and Alexander rank as a tester case, improperly in 
my view, the producers entered not to investigate the employment 
relationship—for example, whether Food Lion failed to pay 
minimum wage; rather, the producers entered in the guise of 
employment to investigate something else in plain view: bad meat-
handling practices. It is therefore not really a tester case as I define 
that class. 
IV. TRESPASS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Our long detour into trespass law may leave us wondering why 
we strayed down that path in the first place.  We are ultimately trying 
to ascertain the civil trespass rule for deception cases so that we can 
apply that rule to law enforcement under the post-Jones-Jardines 
Fourth Amendment trespass test. Part II showed how the old 
Fourth Amendment test, reasonable expectation of privacy, endorsed 
police deception by finding, improbably, that a resident forfeits 
practically all privacy interests by admitting a stranger into his home, 
 
 195. Fargo, supra note 34. 
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at least under many lower court cases such as Miglietta. This Part 
considers how a trespass test will change those results. 
This new Fourth Amendment trespass test emerges from United 
States v. Jones196 and Florida v. Jardines.197 Neither case involved deception 
(hence all the hard work we needed to undertake above). But both cases 
ascertained the appropriate trespass rule drawing on contemporary state 
law trespass cases and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. And both cases 
applied trespass law somewhat literally and technically. 
In Jones, in particular, we can see this literal and technical 
application of a civil trespass rule to law enforcement. There, the 
police affixed a GPS device to the undercarriage of Jones’s Jeep 
Grand Cherokee to follow his whereabouts for four weeks. Under 
traditional principles, the government argued there was no Fourth 
Amendment search because Jones knowingly exposed his 
whereabouts on public streets to everyone. The police could simply 
have followed him, for example. The majority, however, put aside the 
privacy argument and relied upon the trespass test. The police, in 
placing a GPS on Jones’s vehicle, trespassed upon his personal 
property—a personal “effect” under the Fourth Amendment. They 
did so in order to obtain information, and therefore conducted a 
Fourth Amendment search. The trespass may seem minor, barely a 
trespass at all, but it sufficed to amount to a search. 
Let us now turn to apply our civil trespass rule to the police 
deception cases. 
A. Application of Trespass Rule to Police Deception 
As in the journalism cases, the key questions residents ask when 
deciding whether to admit a person into their home is the person’s 
identity and purpose. When a police officer lies about both, and lies 
specifically in order to gain entry, that officer has trespassed. In the 
Miglietta case, DEA agents in UPS uniforms accompanied a real 
UPS agent on three separate occasions. They disguised their identity 
and purpose, leading the resident to believe they were UPS delivery 
persons delivering legitimate packages. 
Miglietta would have excluded the delivery persons had he 
known they were really DEA agents. After all, he had covered the 
windows with Styrofoam in order to hide what appeared to be a 
 
 196. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
 197. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013). 
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methaqualon-pill-making operation.198 But even if we use a 
reasonable person test rather than a reasonable drug manufacturer 
test, an ordinary person would certainly consider it crucial 
information to know that the visitor was not a UPS person but a 
DEA agent conducting an investigation into that particular home. 
Note how trespass changes the analysis. In Miglietta, the court 
drew in part on Hoffa to reason that the resident lacked any privacy 
vis-à-vis the DEA agents because he had ceded his privacy to the 
actual UPS delivery person. Under a trespass analysis, however, the 
resident has the right to selectively exclude: had the DEA agents 
arrived in uniform along with the delivery person, Miglietta could 
have invited the UPS person into his home while refusing entry to 
the DEA agents. 
The Baldwin case would lead even more directly to the same 
result. No one would invite a person to be his bartender, chauffeur, 
and roommate, knowing that person was really a police officer 
investigating him. 
Indeed, Hoffa itself must be reversed under a trespass test. Hoffa 
would never have invited his friend into his hotel room had he 
known the friend was acting as a government informant. Indeed, no 
reasonable person on trial would invite a government informant to 
listen to conversations about the trial—even if he were merely 
prepping in a lawful way and not planning something illegal such as 
bribing jurors. 
But the Lewis line of cases will fare differently under my 
proposed test since I have expressly made an exception for them; 
those cases will not count as trespasses and therefore not trigger the 
Fourth Amendment. Thus, in Lewis itself, the police officer did not 
enter to look around the home to search or seize other evidence; 
rather, he stayed at the porch and merely consummated the drug 
transfer. Also, the act of buying the drugs itself likely takes the 
officer’s actions outside of a seizure since the drugs no longer 
belonged to the defendant.199 Of course, under the plain view 
doctrine,200 had the officer in Lewis seen other drugs, he could have 
seized them or used that information to obtain a search warrant. 
 
 198. United States v. Miglietta, 507 F. Supp. 353, 358 (M.D. Fl. 1980). 
 199. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985). 
 200. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987). 
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Controlled deliveries would likewise remain valid as non-
trespassory. True, the officers do not know for certain that the 
person receiving the package knows of its contents; but nevertheless 
the police are investigating that transaction rather than using a 
legitimate delivery to gain entry to look for other evidence of crime. 
After all, the fake patients in Desnick did not know in advance that 
the doctors there would give faulty diagnoses until they had done so. 
The point is that controlled delivery cases investigate the very 
transaction for which they entered. 
V. ASYMMETRY IN REMEDY 
The above trespass rule harmonizes the police deception and 
journalism deception cases by deeming both to be trespasses (when 
the deception is used beyond the transaction itself). At the same 
time, the rule leads to different outcomes between the two types of 
deceptions: exclusion of evidence in the case of law enforcement 
versus mere nominal damages in most journalism cases. These 
differences may strike some as unsatisfactory or even unprincipled. 
Perhaps. This section will attempt to justify the difference. 
First, the different outcome for police versus journalist deception 
arises from a neutral application of general principles in each area of 
law. Trespass law and ordinary notions of consent lead inexorably to 
the conclusion that such substantial deception to achieve such deep 
intrusions vitiates consent. If we take seriously a trespass test under 
the Fourth Amendment, it must apply to the same conduct as in civil 
cases. So far, in fact, we are treating law enforcement and journalism 
cases the same. 
The difference arises, of course, at the next stage (exclusion of 
evidence for law enforcement or civil damages for journalists). But in 
each realm we simply apply the existing law, albeit seemingly 
technical. In the criminal case we exclude the evidence because that 
is what the law requires under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.201 
In the trespass realm, ordinary and longstanding principles afford 
nominal damages only (putting aside punitive damages, discussed 
below) for trespasses that cause no physical harm to the property.202 
 
 201. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961). 
 202. E.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 515 (4th 
Cir. 1999). 
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Put another way, we can explain the asymmetry as arising from 
the exclusionary rule itself, which already provides a windfall for the 
guilty in order to deter future violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.203 The asymmetry thus arises not from my trespass rule 
but from the separate concerns underlying the exclusionary rule. 
But the larger answer to the asymmetry lies, I contend, in the 
structure of the Bill of Rights, and the different ways in which the 
First and the Fourth Amendments empower and limit the press 
versus law enforcement. The Fourth Amendment both empowers 
and limits law enforcement. It empowers law enforcement by 
endorsing trespasses into the home—a power no one else, including 
journalists, enjoys. Armed with a warrant, the police can enter any 
home, business, or other property, search any closet, safe, computer, 
and search the person in often very intrusive manners.204 
The Warrant Clause gives police unique powers compared to 
journalists and others, but it also imposes unique limits. The 
Supreme Court has insisted that such searches occur only with a 
warrant based upon probable cause.205 Thus, the police power comes 
with a trade-off. The founders drew the appropriate balance in the 
text of the Fourth Amendment, at least as consistently interpreted by 
the Court.206 This balance requiring a warrant and probable cause to 
enter the home should remain intact even if we analyze the intrusion 
under a general “reasonableness” standard, as discussed above.207 
Journalists and other civilians conducting investigations stand in 
the opposite posture. Neither the First Amendment nor any other 
 
 203. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011) (explaining that the 
exclusionary rule is “a ‘windfall’ remedy to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 204. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
782 (1994) (arguing that the framers intended the Warrant Clause solely as a power and not as 
a limit because it afforded officers immunity from civil lawsuits).  
 205. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). 
 206. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596 (1980). Though everyone agrees the 
Warrant Clause provides the power to search (with a warrant) and immunizes the police from 
trespass damages, both scholars and Supreme Court Justices have debated whether any search 
without a warrant is automatically “unreasonable.” See Amar, supra note 204; WILLIAM J. 
CUDDIHY, ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791 (2009); Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 686–87 (1999). But even 
those disagreeing agree that the police need a warrant to search the home. 
 207. See Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (noting that the 
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant and probable cause at least in those cases that did at the 
founding, such as home searches). 
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provision generally affords journalists the right to enter private 
property, no matter how well-founded their suspicions of 
wrongdoing. Neutral trespass laws apply to reporters just as they 
apply to anyone else,208 and a journalist cannot arrive at a person’s 
home demanding entry based upon the Free Press or Free Speech 
Clause. If Sam Donaldson from ABC Primetime Live approached the 
manager of Food Lion, cameras in tow, the manager could demand 
he leave, physically ejecting him if necessary. 
But once the reporters have already trespassed and gathered 
evidence of wrongdoing, then what? The trespass itself, as we have 
seen, accomplishes little if any damages to the property, and so 
nominal damages cap any tort remedy. The information, however, 
once broadcast on prime time television, does cause harm. Food 
Lion, for example, claimed millions of dollars in losses. But this 
harm, arising from true information (if true), does enjoy First 
Amendment protection. As the Court in Food Lion made clear, a 
plaintiff cannot avoid the Free Speech strictures incorporated into 
libel law by instead suing in trespass or fraud, in order to avoid the 
burden of proving that the information was false. The Supreme 
Court drew a similar line for public figures.209 
Put another way, law enforcement has a readily available 
alternative to the use of deception—developing probable cause to 
obtain a warrant. Reporters and animal rights activists lack this vital 
tool, which may be the only means to expose serious wrongdoing to 
the public; in important cases, therefore, we can conceptualize 
trespass law’s award of nominal damages only as winking at such 
journalist’s deceptions, affording, perhaps inadvertently, some play in 
the joints. 
This play in the joints recognizes the long tradition that 
deception has played in the United States in uncovering wrongdoing 
 
 208. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (“[G]enerally applicable 
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press 
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 519 (4th Cir. 1999); Dietemann v Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 
249 (9th Cir. 1971) (privacy tort). 
 209. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“We conclude 
that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue 
without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which 
was made with ‘actual malice.’”). 
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with potential or actual widespread social consequences.210 Though a 
cliché, it remains true that Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle helped bring 
about widespread reform to the meatpacking industry211 through the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906,212 and the accompanying 
outcry helped push passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act.213 Nellie 
Bly’s undercover reporting in an insane asylum brought about 
reform there. 
Even today, the leading journalism cases involve business 
wrongdoing with potential public consequences. A grocery store’s 
meat-handling practices touches public health in ways that individual 
cocaine use does not. An eye clinic’s fraudulent use of eye surgery 
similarly involves wrongdoing affecting scores, or perhaps hundreds, 
of vulnerable victims. Animal rights investigations have likewise 
uncovered not only individual instances of abuse but more pervasive 
practices affecting the entire food supply. 
A. Punitive Damages 
I have drawn a stark contrast between journalists’ trespasses 
leading to nominal damages only versus a police officer’s trespass 
leading to exclusion of evidence, and have done so both for clarity’s 
sake, and to tackle the hardest version of the counterargument to my 
proposal. But am I right to assert that a journalist’s trespass will lead 
to nominal damages even when cases such as Jacque v. Steenberg 
Homes make clear that outrageous trespasses that cause no physical 
harm to property may still support punitive damages?214 By making 
punitive damages available, we might bridge the gap between the 
results of a journalist’s trespass and a police officer’s; punitive 
damages would allow jurors to punish at least the more outrageous 
uses of deception by journalists. Should we authorize jurors to 
impose punitive damages upon journalists who use deception even 
though their trespasses cause no physical harm? 
I would argue no—courts should never or almost never 
authorize punitive damages in journalism cases on matters of public 
 
 210. See KROEGER, supra note 45 (detailing 200-year history of undercover reporting 
leading to important social and legal reform). 
 211. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, THE BULLY PULPIT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF JOURNALISM (2013). 
 212. See 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2012). 
 213. See Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
 214. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159–60 (Wis. 1997). 
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interest because those damages will too often stand in as a pretext for 
recovering for the harm flowing from the publication of true 
information. After all, jurors may well consider the tactics of many 
journalists sufficiently outrageous as to merit punitive damages even 
though these tactics fit squarely within the tradition sketched above. 
Punitive damages would thus circumvent precisely the limits 
imposed by the First Amendment in libel law. 
The Supreme Court’s Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell illustrates 
the problem and provides additional grounds to reject a punitive 
damages regime for journalism cases. There, the magazine published 
a parody in which Jerry Falwell, a famous minister, portrayed saying 
that his “first time” was “during a drunken incestuous rendezvous 
with his mother in an outhouse.”215 The jury rejected Falwell’s libel 
claim, finding that no reasonable reader would fail to recognize it 
was a parody, but the jury did find the conduct outrageous and 
awarded $100,000 in compensation plus $50,000 in punitive 
damages against each defendant for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
The Supreme Court reversed the jury award on the emotional 
distress claim, holding, as noted above, that at least for a journalist 
defendant publishing about a public figure, that public figure cannot 
recover even for “outrageous” parodies without meeting the elements of 
libel. The Hustler holding applies with equal force here: allowing punitive 
damages against reporters using deceptive practices, at least when they 
report on businesses or political organizations, would run afoul of the 
First Amendment. That would cover the type of cases addressed in this 
article, from the Food Lion case to animal rights activists reporting 
undercover on industrial farming. 
Moreover, it would be almost impossible to disentangle our 
political views when considering whether a journalist’s deceptive 
methods were outrageous enough to merit punitive damages. A 
liberal might consider the deceptions in the Food Lion case perfectly 
justified in exposing the evils of big business, whereas a conservative 
might feel precisely the reverse. Or take James O’Keefe, who used 
deception to gain entry to the offices of liberal organization 
ACORN, where he secretly recorded its employees engaging in what 
he portrayed as wrongdoing.216 Not surprisingly, liberals excoriated 
 
 215. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988). 
 216. Chafets, supra at 57. 
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his deceptive tactics while conservatives celebrated them. In both 
cases, reporters used deception to get the story, but if we empower 
jurors to award punitive damages for mushy concepts such as 
outrageous deceptions, we will likely authorize them to decide based 
upon their personal politics rather than some neutral principle. 
(On the other hand, one can imagine a role for punitive damages 
when the reporters invade a home to report on an issue that does 
not involve the public interest.)217 
CONCLUSION 
Each year courts hand down hundreds of decisions addressing 
police use of deception. Law enforcement uses deception as part of 
investigations for a broad array of reasons, including undercover 
drug operations and interrogations. This Article focused on police 
use of deception to gain entry into homes. In particular, the police 
will often lie about their purpose and identity, such as posing as a 
homebuyer or delivery person, in order to gain access to a resident’s 
home and look for evidence of crimes. 
The courts have traditionally approved many police ruses under 
the old Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. 
But this Article showed how the Supreme Court’s new trespass test, 
adopted in 2012 in United States v. Jones, might well render these 
police deceptions Fourth Amendment violations. Jones tells us to 
weigh a police intrusion against the yardstick of civil trespass law, but 
when we turn to the civil trespass cases dealing with entries by 
deception, we discover a deeply incoherent body of law. In other 
words, to answer how the new Jones test will affect police deception 
cases, we must first develop a defensible rule for deceptive trespass 
within the civil context. 
This Article, conceding the uncertainty in the civil cases, 
defended a straightforward principle: when a person lies about her 
identity and purpose to gain entry into a home or the private portion 
of a business, that person has committed a trespass. The core 
purposes of trespass, to allow a person to decide whom to admit and 
whom to exclude, depends in the first instance upon the identity and 
 
 217. Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986). In that case, a 
camera crew accompanied a paramedic team into a resident’s home where they filmed a man 
dying from a heart attack, which they later broadcast. The court held the plaintiffs could 
recover for emotional distress flowing from the trespass. 
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purpose of the person seeking entry. When we apply this rule to the 
police, it means they commit a Fourth Amendment search when they 
similarly lie about their identity and purpose to enter someone’s 
home to search for evidence of crime. Since they generally do so to 
avoid obtaining a warrant with probable cause, any evidence they 
uncover must be suppressed at trial. 
Nevertheless, the question remains: which trespass rule will 
courts pick as the best civil trespass rule and therefore the best rule 
to apply to the police? Above, I have sketched several trespass rules 
developed by different courts but have urged a particular trespass 
rule—that deception as to identity and purpose vitiates consent—as 
the best rule because it best reflects the purposes of trespass law. It is 
this rule that courts should apply to the Fourth Amendment cases 
involving deception. 
